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THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT, MODERN 
PROCEDURE, AND THE ENGLISH COMMON 
LAW 
SUJA A. THOMAS∗
INTRODUCTION 
“[The right of trial by jury] . . . is perpetually spoken of as the 
palladium of our public rights and liberties; and in all the various 
fluctuations of public opinion, it has remained untouched and 
unsuspected.”1
From the time of the founding of the United States, the jury trial was 
recognized as an important part of the governmental structure.2 The 
Seventh Amendment, adopted in 1791, established the right to a jury trial 
in civil cases in federal court.3 Since 1791, however, many new procedures 
that effectively eliminate the civil jury trial have been created.4 Under 
these procedures, a judge possesses substantial power to affect a civil jury 
trial by her authority to dismiss a case before trial, during the trial, or after 
a jury renders a verdict. Before trial, a judge can grant a motion to dismiss 
or a motion for summary judgment. Once a trial begins and after the 
 ∗ Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., New York University 
School of Law; B.A., Northwestern University. I am grateful for the comments of the following 
individuals: Gabriel J. Chin, Adam Feibelman, Mitu Gulati, Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Renée Lettow 
Lerner, Donna M. Nagy, James Oldham, Wendy Parker, Martin H. Redish, Michael E. Solimine, Ted 
Stock, Ellen E. Sward, Tod J. Thompson, Michael P. Van Alstine, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, and Chris 
Bauer. 
 1. John C. Hogan, Joseph Story on Juries, 37 OR. L. REV. 234, 249 (1958) (quoting Justice 
Story’s article “Jury” published in 1831). 
 2. See, e.g., LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 29 (Walter Hartwell 
Bennett ed., 1978) (letters first printed in 1787 and 1788) (“It is essential in every free country, that 
common people should have a part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative 
department.”). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 4. Federal district court judge William G. Young issued an open letter to his colleagues that 
called the “‘withering away’ of the nation’s jury system . . . the ‘most profound change in our 
jurisprudence in the history of the Republic.’” Maggie Mulvihill, A Top Judge Fears Juries Are on 
Wane, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 5, 2003 at 1, available at 2003 WL 3033416. Judge Young advocated 
for changes because “[w]ithout juries, the pursuit of justice becomes increasingly archaic . . . juries are 
the great leveling and democratizing element in the law.” Id. The new procedures discussed in this 
Article have contributed to the decrease in the number of jury and bench trials in federal courts which 
was only 1.8 percent of all dispositions of civil cases in federal court in 2002. See Adam Liptak, U.S. 
Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at A1. 
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plaintiff has presented his evidence, or at the close of all of the evidence, a 
judge can grant a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law for the 
defendant.5 After a jury has found for one party, a judge may grant 
judgment as a matter of law to the other party or may grant a new trial on 
one of several grounds. After a jury has found damages, a judge can 
reduce the verdict either because she found the damages excessive6 or 
because Congress enacted a statute that limits damages under the cause of 
action.7  
Judges increasingly have used such devices, particularly summary 
judgment, to dismiss cases.8 For example, courts frequently dismiss 
employment discrimination cases upon summary judgment,9 and courts 
increasingly have used summary judgment to dismiss other types of cases, 
including antitrust cases.10 The propriety of summary judgment has 
 5. Although a judge could conceivably grant a directed verdict for the plaintiff at the close of 
the evidence, this occurs rarely. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2535 (2d ed. 1995). 
 6. Here, the judge offers a new trial as an alternative to the reduced verdict. 
 7. The Senate and the House regularly consider tort reform to control the awards rendered by 
juries. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Short of Votes, Senate G.O.P. Still Pushes Malpractice Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at A1 (discussing bill that would limit pain and suffering damages in 
medical malpractice cases to $250,000). A few articles have analyzed the constitutionality of statutory 
caps under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The 
Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345 (1995) (arguing that 
statutory caps are unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment); Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don’t 
Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 
(1999) (stating that the Supreme Court has not decided the issue and discussing the arguments for and 
against constitutionality). 
 Appellate judges also possess significant power to affect a jury trial. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont 
& Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from 
Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (2002). This modern appellate power will not be 
studied in detail in this Article.  
 8. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
1 (2d ed. 2000) (summary judgment is “probably the single most important pretrial device used 
today”). 
 9. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999) (arguing federal courts are improperly granting summary judgment 
in Title VII hostile environment cases); JOE S. CECIL, DEAN P. MILITECH & GEORGE CORT, DIVISION 
OF RESEARCH, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, TRENDS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5 (Nov. 2001) (“notably higher rates” of summary judgment in civil rights 
cases); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 99, 101–02 (1999) (discussing judges’ improper use of summary judgment in ADA 
cases, including the refusal of judges to send “‘normative’ factual questions” to juries and a “high 
threshold for defending summary judgment”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured 
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 
206–07 (1993) (increased use of summary judgment in federal employment discrimination cases); see 
also Hillary Richards, Summary Judgment in Sexual Harassment Cases: An Overview of Recent 
Trends, 693 PRAC. L. INST./LITIG. 275 (2003) (“There can be no question that defendants in 
employment cases have used summary judgment more frequently in recent years.”). 
 10. See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Is Interface of Antidumping and Antitrust Laws Possible?, 34 GEO. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
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become an increasingly controversial subject in scholarly debate. Some 
scholars have argued that courts overuse the device,11 while others have 
asserted that the procedure serves a particularly desirable role in the 
litigation system.12  
These same scholars have differed in their views of the 
constitutionality of the procedure, some assuming summary judgment is 
constitutional13 and others expressing concern regarding the 
constitutionality issue.14 The question of the constitutionality of summary 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 363, 390 (2002); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are 
the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and 
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (generally discussing increased use of 
summary judgment in civil cases); Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 
MARQ. L. REV. 141, 141 (2000) (“emergence of summary judgment as the new fulcrum of federal 
civil dispute resolution”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering 
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 
107–08 (1988) (increased grant of summary judgment); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897–98 (1998) (increased use of summary judgment has affected all areas of 
civil litigation). 
 Professor Ellen Sward has written that the use of another modern procedure, judgment as a matter 
of law, has expanded. See ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 298 (2001). On the 
other hand, the procedural device of the new trial appears to be used less often by judges. Id. 
 11. In an article published recently, Professor Arthur Miller argued that the procedural device of 
summary judgment is overused by judges because of judges’ desire to efficiently dispose of cases and 
their concerns regarding the ability of juries. See Miller, supra note 10, at 1016, 1104. Professor Miller 
feared that an unnecessary “judicial intrusion into the factfinder’s realm” will inevitably occur should 
summary judgment expand. Id. at 1068; see, e.g., Beiner, supra note 9, at 71; Colker, supra note 9, at 
101–02; McGinley, supra note 9, at 206–07.  
 12. In an article published recently, Professor Jonathan Molot argued that summary judgment, as 
opposed to a settlement conference, is a particularly desirable device in the court system because the 
parties and the judge play traditional roles such that parties frame the issues and judges decide legal 
questions. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27 
(2003). Molot contrasted the controversial use of settlement conferences with what he viewed as the 
generally uncontroversial pretrial management procedure of summary judgment. Id. at 43–46. He 
stated that summary judgment allowed the parties to frame the issues and the judge to decide the legal 
issues. Id. at 44–45. While Molot recognized that there is some criticism of what he termed the 
aggressive use of summary judgment, he discounts the importance of this issue to advocate that 
summary judgment is preferable to preserve tradition, as opposed to settlement conferences. Id. at 88. 
Molot stated that summary judgment is more traditional but more costly and settlement conferences 
are not traditional but tend to relieve the judicial system of the many burdens of litigation. Id. at 45–46. 
Molot was concerned that in settlement conferences there is no review of the judge’s behavior. Id. at 
44, 89. He argued that judges should be required to write significant decisions if they are to deny 
summary judgment, and also that in addition to strengthening summary judgment standards, judges 
should be encouraged to apply the standards uniformly. Id. at 88. Molot stated that “the summary 
judgment mechanism offers a less dangerous (though more burdensome) substitute for the settlement 
conference.” Id. at 91. In another recent article, the authors argue that judges should decide whether 
summary judgment should be granted before they will enforce settlement agreements. See David 
Rosenberg & Randy Kozel, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary 
Judgment, (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 90, 2004, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=485242). 
 13. See Molot, supra note 12, at 44. 
 14. “Overly enthusiastic use of summary judgment means that trialworthy cases will be 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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judgment and other procedural devices fundamentally influences how 
courts should use the procedures. If a procedure is constitutionally firm, 
then the courts should be encouraged to use the device to the extent the 
procedure comports with and aids other goals of the federal litigation 
system. If, on the other hand, the procedure is problematic 
constitutionally, the courts should reassess its use in the litigation system. 
The Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutionality of modern 
procedures that affect the jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.15 The 
Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law . . ., the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules 
of the common law.”16 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the 
common law” in the Seventh Amendment refers to “the common law of 
England,”17 which Justice Joseph Story stated was “the grand reservoir of 
all our jurisprudence.”18 As a result, in its constitutionality analyses, the 
Court has compared modern procedures that affect the jury trial right to 
procedures under the English common law in 1791, when the Seventh 
Amendment was adopted.19 While none of the modern procedures, except 
the new trial,20 existed under the English common law in 1791, the Court 
determined pretrial on motion papers, possibly compromising the litigants’ constitutional rights to a 
day in court and jury trial.” Miller, supra note 10, at 1071. Miller’s concern is the constitutional 
guarantee of a jury trial; however, he asserted that if no “‘genuine issue of material fact’ exists and the 
movant is entitled to judgment ‘as a matter of law,’ pretrial disposition does not raise questions of 
constitutional dimensions.” Id. at 1075. Other scholars have recognized that “[s]ummary judgment 
rests on a potentially tenuous constitutional foundation.” BRUNET, supra note 8, at 13. For example 
Brunet has stated: 
[W]hen all or part of the issue to be resolved on the summary judgment motion concerns 
whether there exists sufficient evidence to allow the case to go to a jury, then it would be 
quite incorrect to suggest that judicial resolution of that ‘legal’ issue could not conceivably 
threaten the jury’s historic and constitutionally based fact-finding province. 
Id. at 17. 
 15. See infra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 17. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (Story, J.); 
see, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (citing Redman); Balt. & 
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (“The right of trial by jury . . . is the right 
which existed under the English common law when the Amendment was adopted.”); Slocum v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913) (citing Wonson); see also Charles W. Wolfram, The 
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 (1973). 
 18. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750 (stating also that “[i]t cannot be necessary for me to expound the 
grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to every person acquainted with the history of 
the law”). 
 19. The modern procedures to which this Article refers are briefly described above. This Article 
does not examine details of the jury trial right such as the number of jurors who try a case. 
 20. As described below, however, the modern new trial does differ in significant ways from the 
new trial under the common law. See supra text accompanying notes 368–72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
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has determined that all of the new devices by which a court may reduce, 
completely preclude, or eliminate a jury verdict are constitutional.21 In 
many of these decisions, the Court interpreted the Constitution to require 
that the “substance” of the jury trial right must be satisfied22 and decided 
that the procedures did not violate the substance of the right.23 The Court 
has only once found a new device that affected the jury trial right 
unconstitutional and only then when a judge enhanced a jury verdict.24
In its constitutionality analyses, the Court could be said to have taken 
certain missteps. English common law devices such as the demurrer to the 
evidence and the special case could have been described more 
completely.25 Moreover, some of the comparisons between the English 
devices and modern procedures could be said to be oversimplified. For 
example, the common law demurrer to the evidence and the special case 
are compared to the modern judgment as a matter of law, although nothing 
similar to judgment as a matter of law existed under the English common 
law.26 Also the devices under the English common law are labeled as 
inconsistent, although this is not a necessary conclusion.27 This approach 
by the Court to the evaluation of the English common law can be said to 
have led to the lack of a significant standard by which to analyze the 
constitutionality of modern procedures. The current test is unrelated to any 
specific characteristics of the English common law and examines the 
“substance” not the “form” of the jury trial right.28 While this anti-
formalistic approach to the constitutionality analysis may seem reasonable, 
there has not been an appropriate recognition of the fundamental elements 
of the right embodied in the common law. The substance of the right has 
been defined only as: judges should decide law and juries should decide 
facts.29 Leading scholars have closely followed the jurisprudence of the 
 21. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902) (summary judgment); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 54–103. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 68–103. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 68–103. 
 24. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487–88 (1935) (finding additur, the increase of a jury 
verdict, unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment). In Slocum, the Court had found 
unconstitutional the modern procedure of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Redman, 295 U.S. 
at 660–61. Redman essentially overruled Slocum, however. See id. 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 122–99, 287–300; see also Suja A. Thomas, Re-
Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 
(2003) (arguing the Supreme Court did not accurately describe remittitur under the English common 
law and that remittitur is unconstitutional). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 122–99, 287–300. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 122–99, 287–300. 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 68–103. 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 68–103. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court and, like the Court, have adopted a test unconnected to principles of 
the English common law.30 As demonstrated in this Article, however, 
fundamental elements of the common law further differentiate between the 
roles that the jury and the judge should play in a case. 
This Article assumes the validity of the English common law historical 
test to the constitutionality analysis.31 It argues, however, that the 
underlying test, unconnected to actual principles of the common law 
devices, has caused the invariable constitutionalization of procedures that 
are increasingly used by the federal courts.32 This Article develops 
principles derived from the English common law by which modern 
procedures that affect the jury trial right can be reassessed. These proposed 
principles include that procedures permitted under the English common 
law should be constitutional, and that procedures proscribed under the 
English common law should be unconstitutional. Also, if a procedure was 
not proscribed under the common law, the procedure may be constitutional 
if the procedure comports with the other principles of the common law. 
Moreover, under the proposed principles, modern procedures that relate to 
problems with pleadings may be constitutional. Additionally, except on a 
motion for a new trial, a court should not consider the evidence of the 
moving party, and the party seeking to remove a case from a jury should 
admit the truth of the evidence of the non-moving party. Importantly, in 
this decision, a court should not analyze the sufficiency of the evidence of 
what the jury should find or should have found. Also, the moving party 
loses if the admitted facts present a legal claim. Moreover, the emphasis 
should be on the right of the parties for a jury to hear and decide a case.33
Part I begins with an examination of the modern procedural devices 
and an overview of the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the 
constitutionality of the new procedures under the Seventh Amendment. 
Scholarship regarding the “rules of the common law” is then examined. 
Part II analyzes the late eighteenth-century English procedural devices 
used to dismiss a case before a jury heard the case. The devices in place 
during the trial are then explored, followed by an analysis of the 
 30. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
289, 336 (1966). 
 31. See infra note 108. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 54–103; supra notes 8–10. 
 33. This Article sets forth principles to apply in the analyses of the constitutionality of modern 
procedures. It is beyond the scope of this Article to reconsider the constitutionality of each of the 
specific devices. Stare decisis also may play a role in the future constitutionality analyses because of 
the dependency of the present judicial system on modern procedures. For an example of an article 
reconsidering one modern procedure, see Thomas, supra note 25 (considering remittitur). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
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procedures that surrounded the verdict. Additionally, this Part describes 
the procedures used after a jury rendered a verdict. Each subpart on the 
English procedures compares the English procedures to modern 
procedures and critiques the Supreme Court’s analysis of the common law 
devices. Finally, Part III sets forth principles derived from the English 
common law by which the constitutionality of modern procedures may 
begin to be reassessed. 
I. CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODERN 
PROCEDURAL DEVICES THAT AFFECT THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
A. Modern Procedural Devices that Affect the Jury Trial Right 
In federal court, in a case in which a jury trial right exists, a judge may 
dismiss the case before a jury trial or otherwise affect the verdict of a jury 
using procedures at many different junctures of the litigation. Consider 
how a judge could affect a case under the procedures in federal court. The 
defendant may move the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”34 In other words, the defendant may request the 
court to dismiss the case because no legal claim rests on the facts that the 
plaintiff alleged.35 The plaintiff similarly may move the court for judgment 
on the pleadings.36 If the judge does not dismiss the case upon the motion 
to dismiss or judgment on the pleadings, the case typically proceeds to 
discovery.  
After discovery, the parties each have another opportunity before the 
trial to request that the court grant judgment for them on part or all of the 
case. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the judge may grant 
judgment to the moving party if no genuine issue of material fact exists 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.37 Here, the 
judge determines whether any important fact is at issue, and if not, 
whether under the facts and the law, the moving party is entitled to 
judgment. Courts have explained the summary judgment standard as 
requiring that no “reasonable jury” could find for the non-moving party 
under the facts of the case.38 If the judge does not grant summary 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also 5A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 1356, at 294–99. 
 35. See, e.g., UniCredito Italiano SPA v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 288 F. Supp. 2d 485, 497 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); see also 5A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 1367, at 509–17. 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also 10A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2725, at 401–40. 
 38. See, e.g., Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n of Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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judgment, the case proceeds to a jury trial unless the parties have waived 
their rights to a jury trial. 
At the trial, after the plaintiff presents his case, the defendant again has 
the opportunity to obtain judgment before a verdict. Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50(a), the defendant may move the judge for a directed 
verdict or for judgment as a matter of law.39 The court may direct a verdict 
for the defendant if, under the facts established during the case of the 
plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to judgment under the law.40 The 
directed verdict standard is the same as the standard for summary 
judgment—no “reasonable jury” could find for the plaintiff under the 
facts.41 If the judge does not dismiss the case, the defendant proceeds to 
introduce evidence. After the parties have presented all of the evidence in 
the case, either party may move for judgment as a matter of law.42 The 
judge may grant judgment to the moving party if, under the facts, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.43 As with 
summary judgment and the directed verdict, the standard here has been 
interpreted to mean no “reasonable jury” could find for the non-moving 
party.44 The court often reserves this decision until after the jury renders a 
verdict.45
At this time, after all of the evidence has been presented, one or more 
of the parties may request that the jury render a special verdict. Under the 
special verdict, the jury decides the answers to questions posed by the 
judge and upon review of those answers, the judge decides whether the 
plaintiff or the defendant receives judgment.46 A court instead could 
require a jury to answer interrogatories and find a general verdict.47 If the 
answers are inconsistent with the verdict, the judge may enter judgment 
1222, 1228 (M.D. Fla. 2003); see also 10A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2725, at 433–37. 
 39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). While the rulemakers in 1990 changed the terminology from 
directed verdict to judgment as a matter of law, the former phrase will be used in this Article because 
judges often still distinguish the procedures using this phrase and the Supreme Court has used the 
phrase directed verdict in past decisions. 
 40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).  
 41. See, e.g., Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1361–62 (S.D. Fla. 2000); see also 9A 
WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2524, at 261–66. 
 42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See, e.g., Isco Int’l, Inc. v. Conductus, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493–94 (D. Del. 2003) 
(granting judgment where “substantial evidence” does not support jury’s findings); see also 9A 
WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2524, at 261–66. 
 45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a); see also 9A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2505, at 161. 
 47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b); see, e.g., Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 723 (4th 
Cir. 1999); see also 9A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2511, at 217–18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
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for the party for whom the jury did not find, return the issue to the jury, or 
order a new trial.48 If the judge does not give a special verdict or general 
verdict with interrogatories to the jury, the jury will render a general 
verdict for one of the parties. 
After the trial, the losing party may renew a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.49 Alternatively, either party may move for a new trial. 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, the judge may order a new trial 
for several reasons, including that insufficient evidence exists upon which 
a jury could find for the winning party.50 This motion may be granted if 
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.51 The evidence need not 
be examined in the light most favorable to the non-moving party who won, 
and the motion may be granted where “substantial evidence” supports the 
jury verdict.52 Additionally, if the jury rendered excessive damages, the 
defendant may request that the judge reduce the damages to the maximum 
verdict that a reasonable jury could find or in the alternative may request 
the judge to order a new trial.53
As set forth here, a court can affect the rights of the parties to a jury 
trial both before, during, and after trial using a number of procedures 
which may prevent a jury trial, limit the fact-finding of a jury, or eliminate 
the verdict of a jury. The next section describes the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court under which such procedures have been found 
constitutional under the Seventh Amendment. 
B. Supreme Court Case Law Regarding Modern Procedural Devices that 
Affect the Jury Trial Right 
In the twentieth century the Supreme Court assessed the 
constitutionality of several modern procedural devices under the Seventh 
 48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b). 
 49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). 
 51. See, e.g., Egebergh v. Village of Mount Prospect, No. 96-C-5863, 2004 WL 856437, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2004); see also 11 WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2806, at 63–78. 
 52. See Pappas v. New Haven Police Dep’t, 278 F. Supp. 2d 296, 301 (D. Conn. 2003); 11 
WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2806, at 63–78. 
 53. See 11 WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2807, at 78–86; see also Thomas, supra note 25, at 738 & 
n.31. Upon a dismissal of a case for failure to state a claim, upon summary judgment, or for judgment 
as a matter of law, the appellate court will decide de novo whether the judge was correct to dismiss the 
case. See, e.g., Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing Rule 12(b)(6)); 
Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing Rule 56); 
Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing Rule 50(b)). Upon the grant 
of a new trial, the appellate court decides whether it was an abuse of discretion to order a new trial. 
See, e.g., Synder v. City of Moab, 354 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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Amendment. By the end of that century, all but one of the procedures had 
been found constitutional.54 The Supreme Court has held that the 
constitutionality of the procedures should be evaluated against the “rules 
of the common law,” which the Court has held means the rules of the 
English common law in 1791.55 In its analyses of the procedures, the Court 
began with a test where a procedure was unconstitutional if it did not exist 
under the English common law in 1791.56 The Court then moved to a test 
under which a device was constitutional if the substance of the jury trial 
right under the English common law in 1791, as opposed to the specific 
form of the common law procedure, was preserved.57 Later decisions have 
also emphasized fairness and the abilities of judges versus juries.58
The Court has found modern procedural devices unconstitutional only 
in cases in which the Court employed the test that a procedure was 
unconstitutional if it did not exist under the English common law in 1791. 
Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.59 is arguably the first significant 
Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of procedural devices 
that affect the jury trial right.60 In Slocum, the Court found 
unconstitutional the procedure of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
the procedure by which a court orders judgment to the party who loses the 
jury verdict.61 The Court stated that under the Seventh Amendment, when 
a court re-examines a fact tried by a jury, the re-examination must be only 
“‘according to the rules of the common law of England.’”62 Under the 
English common law, upon a re-examination of facts tried by a jury, the 
court could not grant judgment to the verdict loser; it could order only a 
new trial.63  
Similar to the analysis in Slocum, in Dimick v. Schiedt,64 the Court 
found unconstitutional a procedure that did not exist under the English 
common law in 1791. Additur, the option to the defendant to accept, 
instead of a new trial for inadequate damages, a judge-proposed increase 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 55–103. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see infra text accompanying notes 56–103. 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 59–67. 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 68–103. 
 58. See infra text accompanying notes 89–103. 
 59. 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
 60. See 9A WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 2522, at 244. 
 61. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 364. 
 62. Id. at 379 (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899)); see also id. at 399. 
 63. See id. at 399. The dissent argued to the contrary for the constitutionality of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. See id. at 400–28 (Hughes, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the 
procedure did not violate the Seventh Amendment. There had been no facts for the jury to try and the 
defendant was entitled to judgment under the established facts and the law. Id. at 401. 
 64. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
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in the jury verdict, did not exist under the English common law in 1791.65 
In dicta, the Court stated that remittitur, the option to the plaintiff to 
accept, instead of a new trial for excessive damages, a judge-proposed 
reduction in the jury verdict, was constitutional.66 Unlike additur, 
according to the Court, evidence of remittitur existed at common law.67
In these early decisions the Court had strictly adhered to the English 
common law in 1791, finding a procedure was unconstitutional if it did not 
exist under the common law. In this time period, and thereafter, the Court 
also employed another analysis regarding whether a procedure was 
constitutional. This test emphasized the substance of the 1791 English 
common law procedure over its form.68 Under the application of this test, 
many procedures which did not exist under the common law were found 
constitutional. This included the two procedures previously determined to 
be unconstitutional under the first test. 
In Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,69 the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of a modern procedure that did not 
exist under the English common law. Under the common law, a court 
ordered a new trial on all issues, not just some of the issues.70 In deciding 
that a partial new trial was constitutional, the Court stated that “we are not 
now concerned with the form of the ancient rule. It is the Constitution 
which we are to interpret; and the Constitution is concerned, not with 
form, but with substance.”71 According to the Court, the Seventh 
 65. See id. at 476–88. In particular circumstances significantly prior to 1791, such as in cases of 
mayhem, English common law courts increased jury verdicts. See id. at 476–82; James Oldham, 
Determining Damages: The Seventh Amendment, the Writ of Inquiry, and Punitive Damages 27–35 
(Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Washington University Law Quarterly). 
 66. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 482–87. 
 67. See id. This Article analyzes neither remittitur nor additur under the English common law. 
Remittitur as practiced in the federal courts did not exist under the English common law. See Thomas, 
supra note 25, at 763–82. Additur also did not exist. See id. at 733. 
 The dissent, citing Gasoline Products v. Champlin Retaining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931), among 
other cases, disagreed with the majority that the precise procedures in existence in 1791 should limit 
the review of a court of the decision of a jury. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 488–97 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
Instead, in order for a review procedure to be constitutional, it should “preserve the essentials of the 
jury as it was known to the common law before the adoption.” Id. at 490. A court through its power 
under the common law could grant or deny a motion for a new trial for inadequate damages and thus 
could implicitly “determine, as a matter of law, the upper and lower limits” of the permissible 
damages. See id. at 488. As a result, the alternative for the defendant to pay a larger verdict within 
these legal limits which the judge determined, without giving the plaintiff the option for a new trial, 
was constitutional. See id. at 495–98. 
 68. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 71. 
 69. 283 U.S. 494 (1931). 
 70. See id at 497. 
 71. Id. at 498. 
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Amendment required issues of fact to be submitted to the jury.72 Here, 
such issues had been submitted and determined by a jury.73 As a result the 
Seventh Amendment required no more.74  
In Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,75 a case decided a few 
years after Gasoline Products, the Court considered the constitutionality 
of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a procedure that did not exist 
under the English common law and one that the Court had found 
unconstitutional in Slocum. This time the Court found the procedure 
constitutional.76 Here, unlike in Slocum, the judge had reserved the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence.77 The Court reiterated what it 
had said for many years; the English common law in 1791 governed the 
Seventh Amendment analysis.78 However, similar to the analysis in 
Gasoline Products, the Court emphasized “substance” over “form” and 
stated the line should be drawn such that legal issues went to the court and 
factual issues went to the jury.79 The Court noted that at common law 
questions of law could be reserved for a later ruling by the court and the 
result could be judgment for one party when the jury had found for the 
other party.80 Here, the sufficiency of the evidence was a question of law.81 
As a result, judgment for the defendant, rather than a new trial, was 
appropriate where the Court had determined that the evidence was 
insufficient.82  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id at 498–99.  
 74. Id. Although the Court decided a partial new trial could be constitutional, the Court reversed 
the decision of the court of appeals which had ordered a partial new trial because “the question of 
damages on the counterclaim [was] so interwoven with that of liability that the former cannot be 
submitted to the jury independently of the latter without confusion and uncertainty, which would 
amount to a denial of a fair trial.” Id. at 500. 
 75. 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
 76. See id. at 661. 
 77. Id. at 656. 
 78. Id. at 657. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 659–60.  
 81. Id. at 659. 
 82. Id. at 661. The Court stated: 
The aim of the Amendment . . . [was] to preserve the substance of the common-law right of 
trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure, and particularly to 
retain the common-law distinction between the province of the court and that of the jury, 
whereby, in the absence of express or implied consent to the contrary, issues of law [were] to 
be resolved by the court and issues of fact [were] to be determined by the jury under 
appropriate instructions by the court. 
Id. at 657. 
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A few years later, in Galloway v. United States,83 the Court continued 
the jurisprudence begun in Gasoline Products and also set forth in 
Redman. The Court found constitutional another modern procedure that 
did not exist under the English common law.84 Under the directed verdict, 
the judge orders judgment for one party before the jury renders a verdict.85 
In Galloway, it had been argued that the directed verdict and other modern 
procedural devices that did not exist at English common law could not be 
constitutional because of the “incidental or collateral effects” of the 
modern procedures such as “allegedly higher standards of proof” and 
because “different consequences follow[ed] as to further maintenance of 
the litigation.”86 The Court disagreed and found the directed verdict 
constitutional. In language similar to that found in Gasoline Products and 
Redman, the Court stated that “the Amendment was designed to preserve 
the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements.”87 
The Court stated that the “essential requirement [to submit a case to a jury] 
is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after 
 83. 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 390.  
 87. See id. at 392. A number of years later the Court cited this language in its decision that found 
another modern procedural device constitutional. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 
(1979). In Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme Court decided that issue preclusion absent mutuality of the 
parties, which did not exist under the English common law, was constitutional under the Seventh 
Amendment. Id. at 333–38. Citing the general “most fundamental elements” language in Galloway, the 
Court stated that it had previously deemed constitutional a number of procedures that had not existed 
under the English common law. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 336 (citing Galloway v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 372, 388–93 (1943); Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. 494, 497–98 (1935); Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1902)). While the English common law required 
the mutuality of parties, under the English common law, like under this procedure, a party did not have 
the right to have an issue decided by a jury that previously had been decided in an equity court. See 
Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 333. The Court discounted the relevance of Dimick in which the Court 
found unconstitutional a procedure that did not exist at English common law. Id. at 336 n.23. While 
Dimick concerned the second clause of the Amendment, collateral estoppel involved the first clause; 
there was no further factfinding under collateral estoppel because the factfinding was accomplished in 
the first case. See id. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist objected to the denial of a jury trial on the issue 
that had been previously litigated. See id. at 337–50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist 
emphasized the importance of the English common law to the interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment and stated that because issue preclusion absent mutuality of the parties did not exist under 
the common law, the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial in this case. See id. While the ultimate 
conclusion of the majority appears reasonable, assuming that under the common law there is support 
for a party not having a second chance to litigate an issue before a jury after an equity court had 
decided the issue, the reliance of the majority here, and in the other cases, on the amorphous 
“fundamental elements” standard for the constitutionality of modern procedures is discussed in this 
Article. 
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making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the 
party whose case is attacked.”88  
In Gasoline Products, Redman, and Galloway, the Court had departed 
from its analyses in Slocum and Dimick, under which it had stated a 
procedure was unconstitutional if it did not exist under the common law. 
Under the new analysis, the Seventh Amendment required only the 
preservation of the substance of the English common law jury trial in 
1791. The Court characterized the substance of the right as the jury 
serving the role of the fact-finder in a case and the judge serving the role 
of the determiner of the law. This revised test resulted in the 
constitutionalization of all modern procedures evaluated by the Court.  
In the most recent decisions of the Court, the English common law has 
become even less relevant to the Seventh Amendment analysis. In 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,89 the Supreme Court found 
constitutional the appellate review of a denial of a motion for a new trial 
for excessiveness, another device that did not exist under the English 
common law.90 Like judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Court had 
previously deemed the procedure unconstitutional under the original test 
that a procedure was unconstitutional if the procedure did not exist under 
the English common law.91 In Gasperini, for the first time the Court did 
not compare the modern procedure to the English common law. The Court 
 88. 319 U.S. at 395. The Court specifically stated that a formula that requires “‘substantial 
evidence’ rather than ‘some evidence’ or ‘any evidence’ or vice versa” was not helpful to the 
determination of whether a device was constitutional. Id. In Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442 
(1871), the Court discussed how formerly only “a scintilla of evidence” was required to leave a matter 
to the jury and that interpretation had been rejected in favor of “a more reasonable rule” which 
required not only some evidence but “any upon which a jury [could] properly proceed to find a 
verdict.” Improvement Co., 81 U.S. at 448. In Galloway, the Court stated: 
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of 
jury trial according to the common law in 1791 . . . . [n]or were ‘the rules of the common law’ 
then prevalent, . . . crystallized in a fixed and immutable system. . . . [T]hey were constantly 
changing and developing during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390–91; see also BRUNET, supra note 8, at 15 (“collateral effects doctrine 
makes eminent constitutional sense”). The dissent quoted the Seventh Amendment and stated: 
The Court here re-examines testimony offered in a common law suit, weighs conflicting 
evidence, and holds that the litigant may never take this case to a jury. The founders of our 
government thought that trial of fact by juries rather than by judges was an essential bulwark 
of civil liberty. For this reason, among others, they adopted Article III, §2 of the Constitution, 
and the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. Today’s decision marks a continuation of the 
gradual process of judicial erosion which in one hundred fifty years has slowly worn away a 
major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment. 
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 89. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 434–36. 
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justified its decision that the procedure was constitutional on the basis that 
at some point a jury verdict was so excessive so as to become a question of 
law that was reviewable “as a control necessary and proper to the fair 
administration of justice.”92 In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated that 
because such appellate review of a denial of a new trial motion for 
excessive damages did not exist at English common law in 1791, the 
procedure must be unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment.93
The same year that the Court decided Gasperini the Court decided 
another case that involved the constitutionality of a procedure that affected 
the jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment. In this latest case, 
Markman v. Westview Instruments,94 the Court considered whether in a 
patent infringement case the Seventh Amendment requires the jury to 
decide the scope of the rights of a patent holder, also referred to as the 
claim.95 In the past, the Court had “repeatedly” stated that whether the 
issue was one for the jury depended on whether a jury determination of the 
issue was required to preserve the “‘substance of the [English] common-
law right of trial by jury.’”96 A unanimous Court recognized that the 
phrase “‘substance of the common-law right’ [was], however, a pretty 
blunt instrument for drawing distinctions.”97 The Court had “tried to 
sharpen it, to be sure, by reference to the distinction between substance 
and procedure.”98 Moreover, the Court spoke of “the line as one between 
issues of fact and law.”99 However, the Court stated that “[w]here there is 
no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in comparing the modern practice 
to earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know, seeking the 
best analogy we can draw between an old and the new.”100 Finding an 
absence of common law precedent that the jury decided this issue, the 
Court examined the question of whether it would be preferable for the 
 92. Id. at 435.  
 93. Id. at 448–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While Justice Scalia acknowledged that an appellate 
court could review issues of law, he argued that a damages determination by a jury did not involve 
such a legal issue. See id. at 453–54. 
 94. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 95. See id. at 372. 
 96. Id. at 377 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987), which quotes Colgrove v. 
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973)). In dicta, Justice Souter had raised—but did not resolve—an issue 
that had not been addressed previously. He stated “the historical test do[es] not deal with the 
possibility of conflict between actual English common law practice and American assumptions about 
what the practice was, or between English and American practices at the relevant time. No such 
complications arise in this case.” Id. at 376 n.3. 
 97. Id. at 378. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (citations omitted). 
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judge or the jury to interpret the claim.101 Citing existing Supreme Court 
precedent from the mid-nineteenth century, the Court stated that the judge 
should interpret the claim.102 The Court further stated that even if history 
and precedent did not answer the question, judges were better able than 
juries to interpret documents and thus to interpret the claim.103
In all of its decisions, the Court has recognized the English common 
law as somehow influential to the analysis of the constitutionality of 
procedures that affect the jury trial right. The specific role of the common 
law has not remained constant, however. In the first cases a procedure was 
unconstitutional if it did not exist under the English common law in 1791. 
Under this test, some new procedures were found unconstitutional. In 
other decisions, the Seventh Amendment was interpreted to require that 
the substance of the jury trial right under the 1791 English common law, 
not its form, be preserved. The substance of the right was loosely defined 
only in terms of facts decided by juries and the law by judges. All 
procedures considered under this test have been deemed constitutional 
including two procedures previously deemed unconstitutional under the 
original test. Most recently, the Court has decided that certain issues which 
were previously factual and for juries under the common law are now legal 
questions for judges. Additionally, in its analysis finding a procedure 
constitutional, the Court has sometimes examined whether judges perform 
certain functions better than juries.  
Some scholars have advanced an approach similar to that adopted by 
the Supreme Court. In her well known article, Edith Henderson argued 
 101. See id. at 384. 
 102. See id. at 384–85. 
 103. Id. at 388. A recognized authority on the English common law has disagreed with the 
Supreme Court’s assessment in Markman of the role of the jury at common law and the decision that it 
was appropriate to take this matter away from the jury. See James Oldham, The Seventh Amendment 
Right to Jury Trial: Late-Eighteenth-Century Practice Reconsidered, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL 
HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRIAN SIMPSON 235–36 (Katherine O’Donovan & Gary R. Rubin 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right]. Professor Oldham stated that the jury 
would be given the patent interpretation question possibly with non-binding instructions from the 
judge that the jury should decide for one party. Id. at 236. This Article does not further explore this 
question. Oldham stated that there was different reasoning under which it might be argued that the 
question was one for the judge. See infra note 164. 
 For other decisions finding procedural devices constitutional: see Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 
U.S. 440 (2000) (finding constitutional the appellate decision to give judgment to the verdict loser 
when trial court denied judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the alleged improper admission 
of evidence); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967) (finding constitutional the 
appellate decision to give judgment to the verdict loser when the trial court denied judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict based on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence); cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (finding that punitive damages are not facts tried 
by a jury, without considering the English common law). 
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that the test for the constitutionality of a procedure involved “preserving 
the substance of the common law trial by jury and particularly the jury’s 
power to decide serious questions of fact, while allowing rational 
modifications of procedures in the interests of efficiency.”104
In an earlier influential article, Austin Wakeman Scott had also adopted 
a standard unrelated to any particular practices of the English common 
law. He stated:  
The question of the constitutionality of any particular modification 
of the law as to trial by jury resolves itself into a question of what 
requirements are fundamental and what are unessential . . . . [I]t . . . 
should be approached in a spirit of open-mindedness . . . . [I]t is a 
question of substance, not of form.105
Similar to the Court and Henderson, Scott concluded that the issue of 
whether there was a right to a jury trial rested on whether there was a 
disputable fact to be tried by a jury.106
Assuming the validity of the English common law historical test,107 
Part II explores this constitutionality standard unconnected to principles 
derived from the English common law which the Supreme Court and 
scholars have adopted. While this anti-formalistic approach to the 
constitutionality analysis appears reasonable, whether the substance of the 
common law right has been adequately examined has remained unclear. 
The current Seventh Amendment standard curiously, it seems, has led to 
the constitutionalization of virtually every modern procedural device that 
affects the jury trial right. 
The question is whether this current approach adequately accounts for 
principles embodied in the English common law—the common law which 
the Supreme Court has stated constitutes the “rules of the common law” 
 104. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 336; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
339 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Henderson). 
 105. See Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. 
REV. 669, 671 (1918). 
 106. Id. at 690–91. Scott stated: 
The old methods of enforcing the division [of the functions of the court and the jury] which 
were in use before our constitutions were adopted are clearly not unconstitutional. Nor does it 
violate our constitutions to supplement or supersede those methods by other methods more 
readily calculated to effect the division of functions without undue formality or delay. The 
constitutional guaranty does not stand in the way of the accomplishment of the result, much 
to be desired, that there shall be no trial by jury when there is no disputable question of fact to 
be tried, and no new trial when there is no disputable question of fact left undetermined. 
Id. 
 107. See infra text accompanying note 108. 
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under the Seventh Amendment. Can additional principles beyond a 
distinction between fact and law be derived from the English common 
law?108 Part II examines the English common law and the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that discusses specific English common law devices. As 
shown below, the English common law devices could have been described 
more completely and comparisons to modern procedures could be said to 
be oversimplified. Moreover, the procedures have been labeled as 
inconsistent, although this is not a necessary conclusion. Part II begins to 
develop principles from the common law beyond the law/fact distinction. 
Part III further describes the principles and suggests a path that the 
Supreme Court could take in the future analyses of the constitutionality of 
procedures that affect the jury trial right. 
II. THE RULES OF THE COMMON LAW AND MODERN PROCEDURE 
In the period surrounding the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in 
1791, many English common law procedures affected the jury trial right. 
Authoritative treatises, Supreme Court commentary, and scholarship 
recognize the procedures of demurrer to the pleadings, demurrer to the 
evidence, and the nonsuit as the primary methods by which a case that a 
jury would ordinarily hear was removed from the consideration of a jury. 
Additionally, under the common law procedure of the direction of a 
verdict, a judge would attempt to influence the verdict of the jury. Finally, 
in a case decided by a jury, the special case, the special verdict, arrest of 
judgment, and the new trial were methods under the common law by 
 108. This Article assumes that the English common law in 1791 provides the appropriate “rules of 
the common law.” Because the Supreme Court has for many years interpreted the rules of the common 
law as those of the English common law in 1791, this Article seeks only to evaluate whether more 
specific principles than simply a distinction between law and fact may be derived from the English 
common law. But see Thomas, supra note 25, at 761–62 & n.143 (discussing other interpretations of 
common law).  
 While this Article does not seek to analyze the propriety of the Court’s specific use of the English 
common law, the language of the Seventh Amendment with its reference to “rules” and “common 
law” does appear to dictate some structured approach to the constitutionality analysis under the 
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Additionally, the Seventh Amendment itself limits the 
power of the judiciary by the grant of certain cases to only juries and the re-examination by the 
judiciary of facts tried by juries only according to certain rules. As a result, the judiciary should 
arguably act with restraint with respect to the exercise of its power over the jury’s power. See Suja A. 
Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
 The Supreme Court has relied on the English common law in the interpretation of other parts of 
the Constitution that do not explicitly refer to “the common law,” including the Sixth Amendment. 
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359–67 (2004) (relying on the English common 
law in 1791, in deciding the requirements of the Confrontation Clause). 
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which the court could analyze the case for errors or could decide a legal 
issue.109
 109. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 377–78, 387–95 
(Oxford, 2d ed. Clarendon Press 1768); FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE 
TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 307–09, 314, 319–22 (London, printed by W. Strahan and M. Woodfall, for 
C. Bathurst, 1772); 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, IN PERSONAL 
ACTIONS 595–620 (London, Butterworth 1794). 
 Blackstone is recognized as having a significant influence upon the law in colonial America. It has 
been stated, “‘There is no doubt that for many early American lawyers, Blackstone was the common 
law, because, for one thing, they often had no other book.’” Hogan, supra note 1, at 234 (quoting 
RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 287 (1936)); see Dennis R. Nolan, Sir 
William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 731 (1976). The influence of Blackstone was widespread across England, in the courts, 
Parliament and otherwise. See JAMES OLDHAM, 1 THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH 
OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 60 (1992) [hereinafter OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS] (The English Judge Mansfield “admired the Commentaries.” He contributed to and 
edited them.). 
 In its analysis of the constitutionality of modern procedural devices, the Supreme Court has 
discussed the English common law procedures of the demurrer to the evidence, the nonsuit, the 
direction of a verdict, the special verdict, the special case, arrest of judgment (and judgment non 
obstante verdicto), and the new trial. See infra notes 168–99, 232–49, 269–73, 282–86, 294–300, 329–
37, 374–82 and accompanying text. 
 See also Henderson, supra note 30, at 300–17 (discussing demurrer to the pleadings, nonsuit, 
“directed verdict,” demurrer to the evidence, the case reserved (special case), the special verdict, the 
new trial, and judgment non obstante verdicto (arrest of judgment)); Scott, supra note 105, at 678–90 
discussing demurrer to the pleadings, special pleading, demurrer to evidence, instructions to the jury, 
the special verdict, the special case (and reserved point), direction of verdict, compulsory nonsuit, 
attaint and the motion for a new trial; Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 230–35 
(discussing demurrer, non-suit, special verdict, case stated, new trial, and arrest of judgment). 
Additionally, the Complete Juryman published in 1752 discusses new trials and the arrest of judgment 
as the only methods by which the verdict of a jury does not survive. See ANON., THE COMPLETE 
JURYMAN: OR, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS RELATING TO JURORS 262–77 (1752). 
 This Article does not attempt to examine every detail of common law pretrial and trial procedure. 
For example, in the eighteenth century, there was no discovery except as to which the parties 
consented. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 231 n.32. A jury could render a 
verdict for the plaintiff without hearing evidence from the defendant. See OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS, supra at 139. Jurors could be witnesses. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra at 375. The losing 
party in a case was required to pay some amount. See id. at 376. A conditional verdict occurred where 
after a verdict some type of valuation of the damages would occur. See OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS, supra at 151. There were also differences between judges at the time and now. Judges 
received payment based on the number of cases that they heard. Id. at 119. Judges also served in a 
legislative capacity. See id. at 65. 
 Additionally, judges instructed juries as to the law and had more extensive contact with jurors. See 
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 195, 204–11 (2000–2001) [hereinafter Lerner, Transformation of Civil Trial]; cf. Renée 
B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century 
America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 514 (1996) [hereinafter Lettow, New Trial] (English “[j]udges 
had and regularly used power to examine witnesses, sum up evidence, instruct in the law, recommend 
(and sometimes even direct) verdicts, postpone verdicts, informally question jurors before and after 
verdicts as to their reasoning, and send the jury back to redeliberate.”). This aspect of the effect on the 
jury is not examined here except in the description of the direction of a verdict. See infra text 
accompanying notes 250–66 & n.266. Wigmore argued that the elimination of advice by the judge to 
the jury made the jury trial less efficient and impeded justice. See Lerner, Transformation of Civil 
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This Part describes each English common law procedure and compares 
each such procedure to modern procedures. Additionally, the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that discusses the common law and modern procedure 
is set forth. This discussion demonstrates that significant differences exist 
between the modern and common law procedure and that the common law 
procedures could have been described more completely. Moreover, 
differences between the common law and modern procedures have not 
been recognized or have been downplayed; the most significant 
differences have involved the movement of decision-making from juries, 
under the common law, to judges under modern procedure. Examination 
of the English common law reveals consistent principles within the 
common law which thus far have been undiscovered. This Article argues 
that these principles are fundamental to the common law right and should 
be applied in the future assessment of the constitutionality of modern 
procedures. 
A. Procedure Before Trial 
1. Demurrer to the Pleadings 
Under the English common law, a case could be dismissed before trial 
upon a demurrer to the pleadings.110 Under this procedure, the plaintiff or 
the defendant admitted the truth of the plea or the declaration, 
respectively, and argued that he was entitled to judgment under the law.111 
Trial, supra, at 199 (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 557 (2d ed. 1923)). It might be argued 
that modern procedure that arguably permits judges to exercise more control over jury verdicts may 
counter the lessening of direct judicial influence on jury decision-making that had occurred under the 
common law. While as explained here this Article does not examine these differences in the common 
law and modern procedure regarding direct judicial influence, such influence on the jury under the 
common law could be perceived as very different than eliminating jury decision-making under modern 
procedure. See infra text accompanying notes 116–21, 162–99, 230–49, 267–73, 281–86, 293–300, 
325–37, 368–82 (explaining differences between common law and modern procedure); see also infra 
note 266. 
 110. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 314–15. 
 111. See id. “[I]n the late eighteenth century, the demurrer was virtually the only pre-trial method 
in the common law courts to take a case forward for decision without calling a jury. In other words, 
almost all cases in the common law courts were tried before juries. . . . [There was no] procedure 
(other than the demurrer) that would allow a judge to determine before trial that a case presented no 
issue to be decided by a jury, or that an issue in a case should be withheld from the jury.” See Oldham, 
Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 231. In an original study of the plea rolls, Professor 
James Oldham found that demurrer was “quite rare.” See id. at 230–31 (one case on demurrer and 181 
cases sent to jury in Trinity Term 1770 and four cases on demurrer and 197 sent to the jury in Trinity 
Term 1774). Juries tried most cases. Id. Oldham is unsure as to whether the rolls refer to demurrer to 
the pleadings or demurrer to the evidence. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
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If the demurring party was correct, he received judgment. If he was not, 
the court entered judgment for the other party. As an example, Blackstone 
cited a case in which the plaintiff declared that the defendant had 
trespassed upon his property.112 The defendant pled that he had so 
trespassed but justified the trespass on the basis that he was hunting.113 
The plaintiff demurred to the plea, admitting the facts stated by the 
defendant, but stated that he, the plaintiff, was entitled to judgment under 
the law because hunting was not a defense to trespass.114 If the en banc 
court decided that hunting was not a defense, the court gave judgment to 
the plaintiff; if the court decided that hunting was a defense, the court gave 
judgment to the defendant.115
2. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of Demurrer to the Pleadings 
Under modern practice, the motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
summary judgment are two procedures whereby a case may be dismissed 
before trial. The procedure most similar to the common law demurrer to 
the pleadings is the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Under the 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, like the demurrer to the pleadings, 
the truth of the non-moving party’s pleadings is admitted.116 However, 
unlike the demurrer, under the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 
moving party does not give up his right to have his case heard by a jury if 
the motion is denied.117
The modern procedure of summary judgment does not share any 
significant characteristics with the common law procedure of the demurrer 
to the pleadings. Under summary judgment, the judge considers the 
 112. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 323–24. 
 113. Id at 324. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id; see also id. at 315, 317, 323; Duherley v. Page, 100 Eng. Rep. 211, 211 n.(a), 213 (1788) 
(awarding costs to the plaintiff after the court granted judgment upon the demurrer to the plaintiff). 
The en banc court was the full court at Westminster. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 82–85, 138–39 (4th ed. 2002). Under the common law, either the plaintiff or the 
defendant could also assert that there was only an issue of fact in the case. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
109, at 315. That is, either party could admit the law was not disputed. Id. Upon joinder by the other 
party, the case would be decided upon this fact and a jury generally, not the court, would decide the 
fact. Id. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36. 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 110–15. Additionally, under the modern procedure, a 
single judge decides whether to dismiss the complaint, whereas under the common law, the en banc 
court would decide whether to grant the demurrer. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36; supra 
text accompanying notes 110–15. 
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evidence of both the plaintiff and the defendant to determine whether a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.118 If the judge thinks 
a reasonable jury could not find for that party, the judge grants judgment 
for the moving party.119 Under the common law, there was no procedure 
before trial under which a case could be dismissed by the court unless the 
facts alleged were admitted.120 In other words, cases could not be 
dismissed before trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. 
Also, unlike summary judgment, under the common law the facts alleged 
by the demurring party could not be considered by the court, and the non-
demurring party won if the demurring party was not entitled to judgment 
under the admitted facts.121
Because the English common law of 1791 governs the constitutionality 
analysis of modern procedures that affect the jury trial right, consistent 
principles derived from this common law should constitute the 
fundamental elements by which the Supreme Court should assess the 
constitutionality of these procedures. Under the common law, a party 
moving for judgment must have admitted the facts alleged by the non-
moving party and could not have proffered any facts itself. The 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. 
 120. Summary judgment was established in England only in the mid-nineteenth century. See, e.g., 
Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1928–1929); 
SWARD, supra note 10, at 275.  
 121. Moreover, under the common law, only the en banc court, not a single judge, could dismiss a 
case prior to trial. 
 In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court cited Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902), in support of the proposition that summary 
judgment was constitutional under the Seventh Amendment. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 336 (citing Fidelity, 
187 U.S. at 319–21); see also BRUNET, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that the Supreme Court found 
summary judgment constitutional in Fidelity). In Fidelity, the Supreme Court did not compare any 
English common law procedure to the procedure in question—a court rule regarding contract actions. 
Under the rule, the court granted judgment to the plaintiff if the plaintiff filed an affidavit with the 
reason for the action and the amount that was due, and the defendant did not, by affidavit, deny the 
claim of the plaintiff or did not specifically state a defense that if true, the defendant would prevail. 
Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 318–19. The Supreme Court decided that the rule generally did not deprive the 
defendant of the right to a jury trial because a jury trial would ensue in cases in which the defendant 
raised an issue to be tried by the jury. Id. at 319–20. The Court decided that there was no such issue. 
The plaintiff Smoot had contracted with Vinson whose contracts the defendant Fidelity & Deposit Co. 
guaranteed. Id. at 316. Vinson allegedly did not pay and the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the 
alleged amount owed. Id. at 316–17. Pursuant to the rule, Smoot filed an affidavit that alleged the 
existence of the contracts and the amounts due to Smoot. Id. In an affidavit in response, the defendant 
admitted that the contracts had been executed but asserted that it lacked sufficient knowledge of the 
debt claimed by Smoot. Id. at 317. Because the defendant had not raised any defense to the suit, the 
Court decided that there was no issue to be tried by the jury and that the plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment. Id. at 317–22. The court rule in Fidelity appears to be similar to the modern motion to 
dismiss, not the procedure of summary judgment, and consequently has similarities as noted above to 
the common law demurrer to the pleadings. 
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determination here was purely a legal question, not a question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence. The result was the moving party lost if the 
facts admitted presented a legal claim. 
B. Procedures During Trial 
1. Demurrer to the Evidence 
Under the procedure of demurrer to the evidence, the party admitted 
the truth of the opposing party’s evidence.122 If no cause of action or 
defense existed under the law under the facts admitted by the demurrant, 
the en banc court would grant judgment for the demurrant.123 If, on the 
other hand, a cause of action or defense existed under the admitted facts, 
because the demurrant admitted these facts and had not presented 
evidence, the court granted judgment to the non-demurring party.124 Where 
the evidence was circumstantial, the party could demur successfully only 
if that party admitted all facts offered to be proved by the opposing party 
even when “offered to be proved only by presumptions and 
probabilities.”125 If the demurring party did not admit the facts but the 
opposing party agreed to the demurrer, the court would send the matter for 
a new jury trial because only the jury could determine the facts.126 As 
stated below, the demurrer to the evidence was rare.127
 122. BULLER, supra note 109, at 307. The dissent in Galloway v. United States stated that “[t]he 
principal method by which judges prevented cases from going to the jury in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries was by the demurrer to the evidence.” Galloway, 319 U.S. 372, 399 (1943) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 123. See BULLER, supra note 109, at 307. 
 124. See, e.g., BULLER, supra note 109, at 307–08; Scott, supra note 105, at 683 (stating under 
demurrer to evidence, judgment for non demurring party when jury could have found but not 
necessarily would have found for non-demurring party); William Wirt Blume, Origin and 
Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L. REV. 555, 561–62 (1950) (describing demurrer to 
evidence). 
 125. In 1772, in his treatise, Justice Buller explained the demurrer to the evidence: 
He that demurs to Evidence admits it to be true, and if the Matter of Fact be uncertainly 
alledged [sic], or it be doubtful whether it be true or not, because offered to be proved only by 
Presumptions and Probabilities, and the other Party will demur thereupon, so that the Truth of 
the Fact as well as the Validity of Evidence be referred to the Court, he that alledges [sic] this 
Matter cannot join in Demurrer, but ought to pray Judgment of the Court that his Adversary 
may not be admitted to his Demurrer, unless he will confess the Matter of Fact to be true; and 
if he do not so do, but join in Demurrer, he has likewise misbehaved, and the Court cannot 
proceed to Judgment, but a Venire de Novo shall go. 
BULLER, supra note 109, at 307. 
 126. In 1768, Blackstone described the demurrer to the evidence as occurring: 
[W]here a record or other matter is produced in evidence, concerning the legal consequences 
of which there arises a doubt in law: in which case the adverse party may if he pleases demur 
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The leading English case on demurrer to the evidence is the post-
Seventh Amendment case of Gibson v. Hunter,128 which, as discussed 
below, was consistent with the pre-Seventh Amendment jurisprudence on 
demurrer.129 In this case, the House of Lords, the supreme judicial body of 
England, set forth the high standard for the grant of a demurrer to the 
evidence. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendants defrauded him of 
money on a bill of exchange signed by an allegedly non-existent party.130 
Because the plaintiff’s action alleged matters involving the context of the 
bill of exchange, specifically that the signature on the bill belonged to no 
real person and that the defendants had committed this fraud, the plaintiff 
introduced not only the bill itself, the writing, into evidence, but also 
testimony of two clerks involved in the bill’s creation.131
The defendants demurred to the plaintiff’s evidence,132 and the King’s 
Bench granted judgment for the plaintiff.133 On appeal, the issue was how 
to construe the evidence produced by the plaintiff.134 The Lords 
emphasized that the procedure of demurrer to the evidence was not 
common. “The questions referred to by your Lordships to the Judges, arise 
upon a proceeding, which is called a demurrer to evidence, and which 
though not familiar in practice, is a proceeding well known to the law.”135  
The Lords explained that the standard governing the uncommon 
demurrer to the evidence had been confused:  
My Lords, in the nature of the thing, the question of law to arise out 
of the fact cannot arise till the fact is ascertained. It is the province 
to the whole evidence; which admits the truth of every fact that has been alleged, but denies 
the sufficiency of them all in point of law to maintain or overthrow the issue: which draws the 
question of law from the cognizance of the jury, to be decided (as it ought) by the court. 
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 372–73. 
 127. See infra text accompanying note 135. 
 128. 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id at 499. 
 131. Id. at 499–506. 
 132. Id. at 506. 
 133. Although the demurrer was to be argued before the King’s Bench, “it being the 
understanding of both parties that a writ of error was to be brought, the Court gave judgment for the 
Defendant in error, without argument.” Id. at 506. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 508. (emphasis added). In his treatise published in 1768, Blackstone stated: 
[D]emurrers to evidence, nor the bills of exceptions, are at present so much in use as 
formerly; since the more frequent extension of the discretionary powers of the court in 
granting a new trial, which is now very commonly had for the misdirection of the judge at 
nisi prius. 
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 372. 
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of a jury to ascertain the fact, under the direction and assistance of 
the judge; the process is simple and distinct, though in our books 
there is a good deal of confusion with respect to a demurrer upon 
evidence.136  
The issue in the case was what were the facts to which the court 
applied the law upon the demurrer to the evidence. The Lords established 
the difference between the presentation of written evidence and 
“circumstantial” evidence upon a demurrer. A party offering written 
evidence must join a demurrer because “‘there cannot be any variance of 
matter in writing.’”137 A party also was required to join in a demurrer upon 
his presentation of circumstantial evidence if, analogous to a writing, the 
facts were not disputed or in other words the circumstantial evidence was 
admitted: 
[I]f the matter of fact be uncertainly alleged, or that it be doubtful 
whether it be true or no, because offered to be proved by 
presumptions or probabilities, and the other party demurs 
thereupon, he that alleges this matter, cannot join in demurrer with 
him, but ought to pray the judgment of the court, that he may not be 
admitted to his demurrer, unless he will confess the matter of fact to 
be true.138
Thus, for example, if the defendant admits as true the testimony of 
witnesses offered by the plaintiff, the plaintiff must join in the demurrer of 
the defendant.139
 136. Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 508. If a party demurred to the evidence, the facts must “be first 
ascertained,” so that the judge could apply the law to the facts. Id. at 509. The standard for demurrer 
had been confused with the standard for the bill of exceptions. Id. at 508; see also 3 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 109, at 372 (stating that unlike the demurrer to the evidence, a bill of exceptions is decided 
by the appellate court, not in the court out of which the case arose). A bill of exceptions would be pled 
to preserve for appeal a judge’s legal decision at trial, on for example the admissibility of evidence. 
See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 508. The bill of exceptions did not, however, remove the ultimate issue 
from the jury: “The admissibility of the evidence being established [by the Judge], the question how 
far it conduces to the proof of the fact which is to be ascertained, is not for the Judge to decide, but for 
the Jury exclusively.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 509 (quoting Baker’s Case, Cro. Eliz. pt. 2 753); see also 3 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 368 (written evidence includes “1. Records, and 2. Ancient deeds of 
thirty years standing, which prove themselves; but 3. Modern deeds, and 4. Other writings, must be 
attested and verified by parol evidence of witnesses”). 
 138. Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 510 (quoting Wright v. Pyndar, 82 Eng. Rep. 499 (1647) (emphasis 
added)). 
 139. See id. at 509; see also 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 584 (“[W]here a demurrer to evidence is 
admitted, it is usual for the court or judge, to give orders to the associate, to take a note of the 
testimony; which is signed by the counsel on both sides”). 
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In Gibson, the Lords found that the demurrer failed.140 The allegation 
by the plaintiff of fraud involved predominately circumstantial 
evidence.141 On demurrer, the defendant was required to admit the factual 
conclusions of the plaintiff.142 Therefore, for the defendant to demur and 
request that the court find in its favor would be for the defendant to admit 
the fraud. The defendant had not done so. Because “there [was] no manner 
of certainty in the state of facts upon which any judgment [could] be 
founded,” no judgment could be given.143 Instead a new trial was 
awarded.144
Lord Chief Justice Eyre, writing for the Lords, concluded “after this 
explanation of the doctrine of demurrers to evidence, I have very confident 
expectations that a demurrer like the present will never hereafter find its 
way into this House.”145 It was improper to discharge the jury without a 
verdict when the defendant did not admit “‘every fact, and every 
conclusion, which the evidence given for the Plaintiff conduced to 
prove.’”146 As this opinion makes clear, it would be extremely rare for a 
court to grant a demurrer to the evidence because a court could not grant 
judgment to the defendant unless the defendant admitted every possible 
fact and conclusion that the evidence of the plaintiff was offered to prove.  
Cocksedge v. Fanshaw,147 decided before Gibson, in the immediate 
time period before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, further 
demonstrates under what circumstances demurrer to the evidence was 
appropriate under the English common law in 1791. The issue was 
whether freemen of London were exempted from paying a duty on corn, 
whether the corn had been consigned to them as factors,148 or was their 
own corn.149 The plaintiff corn merchant argued that he had a right to have 
the duty returned regardless of whether it was owned or consigned to him, 
and the defendant toll collector argued that the merchant was exempt from 
the duty only if he owned the corn.150 Two issues were presented: what 
was the usage and custom regarding the toll, and was this usage and 
 140. Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 510. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 99 Eng. Rep. 80 (1779). 
 148. A person who sells goods on commission. 
 149. See Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 85. 
 150. Id. at 81; see also OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 109, at 691–95. 
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custom the result of fraud.151 After two previous jury verdicts against the 
defendant, upon the third action, the defendant demurred to the evidence, 
arguing against the existence of immemorial custom and usage and that 
any such custom and usage was the result of fraud.152
Justice Mansfield’s opinion is significant and consistent with the 
subsequent House of Lord’s decision in Gibson. He emphasized that if it 
were at all possible, not probable, that the custom and usage had legal, 
non-fraudulent origins, then the court must find in the plaintiff’s favor on 
the demurrer to the evidence: 
If, by no possibility, such a privilege could have a legal 
commencement, then, to be sure, the fact of its existence does not 
decide the question; because in point of law, that does not establish 
the right; but the rule of law is, that wherever there is an 
immemorial usage, the Court must presume every thing possible, 
which could give it a legal origin. Whether probable or not, is for a 
jury to decide.153
Justice Buller noted that the legal standard for the demurrer to the 
evidence and the special verdict was the same:  
Now, if this cause had been put into the shape of a special verdict, 
what must have been stated on the record? The jury could not find 
all the evidence set forth in the demurrer, but must have pronounced 
upon the fact, whether or not such an immemorial custom had 
existed, and then it would have been for the Court to decide, 
whether such a custom was good in law.154  
Justice Buller also had stated:  
It is the province of a jury, alone, to judge of the truth of facts, and 
the credibility of witnesses; and the party cannot, by a demurrer to 
evidence, or any other means, take that province from them, and 
draw such questions ad aliud examen. I think the plain and certain 
rule is this: the demurrer admits the truth of all facts, which, upon 
 151. See Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. 80; OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 109, 
at 691–95. 
 152. Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 86; see also OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra 
note 109, at 691–95.  
 153. Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 88 (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. at 89. 
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the evidence stated, might be found by the jury in favour of the 
party offering the evidence.155
The Court gave judgment to the plaintiff, denying the demurrer, because 
the usage and custom could have a legal origin.156 For example, the city 
could have created it to facilitate the corn trade.157
English courts had infrequently granted demurrers because the standard 
was difficult to meet, and after the Lords in Gibson further clarified the 
standard, courts granted demurrers even less frequently.158 As Thayer 
stated: 
And so, when once the demurring party was driven from his vague 
expectations of getting something out of a court, in the considering 
of his evidence, which he might not get from a jury; when once it 
was forced clearly upon his attention, that, not only did a demurrer 
upon evidence commit him irrevocably to all those inferences from 
the evidence which were most unfavorable to him, but that he must 
set these conclusions all down in writing beforehand, then this 
ancient instrument of justice fell wholly into disuse in England.159
The demurrer was intended only as a procedure by which a party could 
avoid the risk of a decision from a jury that did not apply the law. For 
example:  
If a judge allow the matter to be evidence, but not conclusive, and 
so refer it to the jury, no bill of exceptions will lie; as if a man 
produce the probate of a will, to prove the devise of a term for 
years, and the judge leave it to the jury; because though the 
evidence be conclusive, yet the jury may hazard an attaint, if they 
 155. Id. at 88–89. 
 156. See Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 88–89; OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra 
note 109, at 694. 
 157. See Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 88. 
 158. See 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH, AND COMMON 
PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT: TO WHICH ARE ADDED, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
EXTENTS; AND THE RULES OF THE COURT, AND MODERN DECISIONS, IN THE EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS 
866 (R.H. Small ed., 3d. Am. ed. 1840) (discussing Gibson v. Hunter); Lettow, New Trial, supra note 
109, at 521 n.102; William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 905–13 (1978); Henderson, supra note 30, at 
305. James Bradley Thayer stated that “[n]ear the end of the last century demurrers upon evidence got 
their death blow in England, by the decision in the case of Gibson v. Hunter, carrying down with it 
also the great case of Lickbarrow v. Mason.” JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE OF 
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 235 (1898). Thayer stated that demurrer was not necessary where 
new trials could be ordered. Id. at 238. 
 159. THAYER, supra note 158, at 236–37. 
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please, and the proper way had been, to have demurred to the 
evidence.160
Under the demurrer to the evidence the court accepted as true any 
possible fact or conclusion to be drawn by the jury of the evidence of the 
non-moving party. In other words, a court could not grant judgment for the 
defendant even if the court believed the facts or conclusions of the plaintiff 
were not “probable” or “reasonable” under the evidence presented by the 
plaintiff. The only justification at common law for the removal of issues of 
fact from a determination by the jury was that there was no issue of fact 
for the jury to determine. Moreover, this was not merely because the court 
reasoned that it was so, but because both parties either agreed or were 
required to agree (with evidence of record or writing) as to the facts. 
2. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of Demurrer to the Evidence 
The 1791 English common law procedure and the modern procedure 
during a trial are significantly different. While both the common law 
procedure of demurrer to the evidence and the modern directed verdict 
occur during the trial, the demurrer to the evidence is not similar to the 
directed verdict. The procedure of the directed verdict is the method in 
federal court today by which a case may be removed from a jury during 
the trial. Under the directed verdict, the defendant may request that the 
trial judge dismiss the case after the plaintiff has presented his case, or 
either party may request judgment at the close of all of the evidence before 
the jury decides the case.161 Similar to the standard for summary judgment, 
under the directed verdict, the judge considers whether a reasonable jury 
could find for the non-moving party.162 In contrast to the directed verdict 
under which a court may consider the evidence of both the plaintiff and 
the defendant, under the demurrer to the evidence the en banc court 
considered the evidence of only the non-demurring party.163 Additionally, 
unlike the directed verdict in which the judge decides whether a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, under the demurrer, 
the court did not engage in such an analysis of the facts.164 Only the jury 
 160. 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 578. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 122–23. 
 164. Professor Oldham touched on the subject of whether at English common law, judges decided 
certain issues upon which a reasonable jury could not disagree. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment 
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could determine the facts. Whether the evidence was probable or not was 
for the determination of the jury.165 The demurrer was similar to a special 
verdict such that all of the facts were set forth. The parties agreed to the 
facts and the judge applied the law to the facts, or the parties were required 
to agree because of the existence of a writing upon which the court could 
make a legal determination as to its meaning.166 Finally, under the 
demurrer to evidence, if the court determined that the non-demurring party 
had a claim or a defense, the demurring party automatically lost because 
he had admitted the facts and conclusions of the opposing party and had 
not put forth any evidence himself.167 Under the modern directed verdict, 
on the other hand, the moving party will be permitted to continue his case 
even if he loses his motion. 
Right, supra note 103, at 235–38 (citing Stephen Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867 (1966)). He stated that in the English case of Tindal v. Brown, 99 
Eng. Rep. 1033 (1786), it was established that what notice was reasonable in commercial cases was a 
legal issue. Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 235–38. As a result he stated that it 
could be legitimately argued that certain issues could become legal if reasonable minds could not 
disagree and thus it would be constitutional under the Seventh Amendment for a judge to decide those 
issues. Id. In Tindal, while the court did state that what notice was reasonable was a legal issue, the 
court left the case to the jury to decide, granting a new trial. Tindal, 99 Eng. Rep. 1033; see also 
Appleton v. Sweetapple, 99 Eng. Rep. 579 (1782); Medcalf v. Hall, 99 Eng. Rep. 566 (1782). 
Additionally, the court noted that “when . . . facts are established, it then it becomes a question of law 
on those facts, what notice shall be reasonable.” Tindal, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1035. So the facts, it seems, 
must be undisputed before the question becomes a legal one. In Tindal, after a second jury verdict for 
the plaintiffs and the grant of a new trial motion, the third jury found a special verdict and the judge 
granted the defendant judgment upon the facts found by the jury. See Tindal, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1036 & 
n.(a). Upon the first motion for a new trial, the judges had stated that this was a legal question for the 
sake of “diligence and certainty.” Id. at 1034. The judges did not assert that reasonable minds could 
not disagree. The courts before and after this time period surrounding the Seventh Amendment took a 
different view than the court in Tindal, finding the question of what notice is reasonable for the jury. 
See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 235–38; see, e.g., Muilman v. D’Eguino, 
126 Eng. Rep. 705 (1795). In the context of negligence and malicious prosecution cases, Weiner 
discussed the constitutional question of whether certain questions became legal if a reasonable jury 
could not disagree. Weiner stated that because of lack of affirmative authority under the English 
common law in 1791 that juries should decide whether ordinary care had been exercised in negligence 
cases the constitution did not require that the jury decide this question. See Weiner, supra, at 1891–92. 
Weiner acknowledges that in the late eighteenth century the common law action of trespass on the 
case, upon which there would be a jury trial, could be analogized to negligence. See id. at 1890–91. 
Also less than fifty years later, English courts recognized the issue of ordinary care as one for the jury. 
Id. at 1891. Weiner’s conclusion was that the question for judges is at minimum subject to 
disagreement and more study. Weiner also stated that in cases of malicious prosecution, the judge may 
decide the legal question of whether probable cause has occurred but only upon established facts or 
facts presumed true. See id. at 1916; see also Joshua Getzler, The Fate of the Civil Jury in Late 
Victorian England: Malicious Prosecution as a Test Case, in “THE DEAREST BIRTH RIGHT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF ENGLAND”: THE JURY IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 226–34 (John W. Cairns & 
Grant McLeod eds., 2002). 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 153. 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 137–39. 
 167. See supra text accompany note 124. 
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Although these differences between the common law procedures and 
modern procedures are stark, several Supreme Court justices have 
compared the modern directed verdict to the demurrer to the evidence.168 
This started with the description by the dissent in Slocum v. New York Life 
Insurance Co.169 Justice Hughes stated that the modern directed verdict 
was similar to the demurrer to the evidence.170 Demurrer to the evidence 
was characterized as a procedure under which the court could decide the 
legal sufficiency of the evidence.171 The dissent asserted that under the 
demurrer to the evidence, the court could dismiss a case upon a 
determination that there was no evidence of the fact at issue.172 There, 
where the issue was the existence of a contract at the time of the plaintiff’s 
husband’s death, and there was no evidence of the existence of a contract 
at the time of the plaintiff’s husband’s death, only a question of law for the 
court remained.173
The demurrer to the evidence was not described completely by the 
dissent. Under that device, whether there was any evidence of the fact at 
issue must have been agreed upon by the parties, or the parties could not in 
essence disagree because the only facts were a writing upon which the 
court would make a legal determination as to its meaning. The existence of 
the contract, on the other hand, was a question of fact for the 
determination of the jury. 
In Galloway v. United States,174 the Supreme Court again examined, 
among other common law devices, the demurrer to the evidence.175 In this 
 168. Scholars previously have criticized the Supreme Court’s comparison of 1791 procedures to 
present day procedures. See BRUNET, supra note 8, at 15 n.13; ELLEN E. SWARD, The Seventh 
Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573 (2003). 
 169. 228 U.S. 364 (1913) (Hughes, J., dissenting). The dissent’s description is particularly 
relevant because the conclusion of the dissent essentially represents the current jurisprudence of the 
Court on judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See supra text accompanying notes 75–82. 
 170. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 408–09. The majority had cited Gibson, Wright v. Pynder, 82 Eng. 
Rep. 499 (1647), and Middleton v. Baker, 78 Eng. Rep. 983 (1600), in its decision that distinguished 
the demurrer to the evidence from modern procedure. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 388, 391–92. Although 
the dissent also cited and discussed those cases, see id. at 409–12, these cases do not support the 
dissent. In Wright, where the issue was whether there was a writ, the court decided that a demurrer 
upon the evidence was inappropriate because there was no writing entered into the pleading upon 
which the court could determine the ownership of the property. See Wright, 82 Eng. Rep. 499 (1647). 
The issue here was not the legal implication of the writing, rather whether there was a writing, a matter 
improper for a demurrer to the evidence. See id. In Middleton, the court stated that a party could not be 
compelled to join a demurrer upon evidence where evidence is given by a witness. See Middleton, 78 
Eng. Rep. 983, 983 (1600). 
 171. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 408–09. 
 172. Id. at 409. 
 173. Id. at 401–02. 
 174. 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
 175. Id. at 391 n.23. The discussion of the Supreme Court regarding the nonsuit is found infra text 
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case, the Court held that the modern directed verdict was constitutional. 
Here, the Court, unlike the dissent in Slocum, recognized differences 
between the common law procedures and modern procedures.176 However, 
the Court found these differences irrelevant.177 The Court stated that the 
common law was continually changing and as a result the specific 
procedures of the common law in 1791 did not bind the federal courts.178 
The Court stated that demurrer to the evidence was one such procedure 
that had changed under the common law.179 The Court did not describe the 
change, however.180 The Court also criticized some of the characteristics 
of the demurrer to the evidence. Demurrer to the evidence was described 
as essentially depriving the challenger of his right to a jury trial because a 
party was required to give up his own case to challenge the sufficiency of 
the other’s case.181  
accompanying notes 232–49. 
 176. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 389–92. 
 177. See id. at 394. 
 178. See id. at 391–92. 
 179. Id. at 391 n.23 
 180. See id. With respect to the demurrer to the evidence, the Court cited the following English 
authorities: 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, 2 TIDD’S PRACTICE, Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, and 
Gibson v. Hunter, all of which are analyzed supra. Id. The Supreme Court cited Cocksedge and 
Gibson to argue the change and thus inconsistency of the common law. Id. No significant difference 
between the cases exists, however. While Gibson appears to require the facts admitted to be recorded 
and Cocksedge appears not to, see SWARD, supra note 168, at 610, the substance of the description of 
the demurrer to the evidence is the same in both cases. Under both cases, the facts were required to be 
admitted and probabilities and possibilities could not be weighed, except by a jury. See supra text 
accompanying notes 128–57. Moreover, Professor Sward commented that the apparent change to 
require recording made it only more difficult to obtain a demurrer and does not support the conclusion 
in Galloway that the change supported making it easier to take cases from juries. See Sward, supra 
note 168, at 610. The Court also cited the Supreme Court case of Pawling v. United States, 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) 219 (1808). In Pawling, the Court discussed the demurrer to the evidence and described that 
the court should draw only “such conclusions as a jury might justifiably draw,” an incorrect 
characterization of the demurrer to the evidence. Pawling, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 221; Galloway, 319 
U.S. 372, 395 n.32 (1943). 
 181. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392. In the case, the plaintiff had sought coverage under an insurance 
policy for his disability of insanity. Id. at 372. The insurance company denied coverage because it 
stated that the plaintiff was not disabled when the policy lapsed. See id. at 372–74. The plaintiff 
introduced evidence of his insanity during the time shortly before the policy ended and thereafter. Id. 
at 383. The plaintiff did not introduce evidence of insanity for all periods of time up until the time that 
there was no dispute that he was insane. See id. at 383, 386. Also, the defendant presented testimony 
that contradicted that the plaintiff was insane. See id. at 385. After all of the evidence was presented, 
the Court granted the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict finding that the evidence was not 
sufficient to show the insanity of plaintiff and thus the jury should not decide the case. See id. at 387–
88. The Court stated: 
The jury was not absolute master of fact in 1791. Then as now courts excluded evidence for 
irrelevancy and relevant proof for other reasons. The argument concedes they weighed the 
evidence, not only piecemeal but in toto for submission to the jury, by at least two 
procedures, the demurrer to the evidence and the motion for a new trial. The objection is not 
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Justice Black’s dissent, on the other hand, emphasized that the 
demurrer to the evidence was the main method under the common law by 
which an issue could be kept from a jury.182 The dissent criticized the 
majority’s supposition that there were only minor differences between the 
demurrer to the evidence and the modern directed verdict.183 Under the 
modern directed verdict, the movant no longer faced the risk of losing his 
case, and the standard changed from what the dissent characterized as the 
“‘admission of all facts and reasonable inferences’” under the demurrer to 
the evidence to the “‘substantial evidence’ rule” under the directed 
verdict.184 The dissent asserted that a court should grant a directed verdict 
only where “there is in the evidence no room whatever for honest 
difference of opinion over the factual issue in controversy.”185  
The demurrer to the evidence was not described completely by the 
majority nor by the dissent in Galloway. Both characterized the demurrer 
to the evidence as a procedure whereby the court decided whether there 
was any reasonably possible inference of the facts at issue. Under the 
demurrer, facts were not weighed in this manner by the court. Instead, the 
court decided a demurrer only if there were no issues of fact, not because 
the court determined this but rather because the parties agreed to, or were 
required to, agree to the facts.  
The argument of the majority that the demurrer changed, and as a result 
the characteristics of the procedure are not important to the analysis under 
the Seventh Amendment, also is subject to critique. In the time 
therefore to the basic thing, which is the power of the court to withhold cases from the jury or 
set aside the verdict for insufficiency of the evidence. 
Id. at 390 (citing 3 GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1181–85 (1792); Rex v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 
(1696); Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782)). Rex v. Paine and Folkes v. Chadd support only 
that the jury decided the facts and that the judge or court makes legal determinations, including 
regarding the admissibility of evidence. In Rex v. Paine, the jury rendered a special verdict and the 
court considered whether under the facts found by the jury and under the law, the defendant was guilty 
of libel. See Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585–87. In Folkes v. Chadd, the court decided that the trial judge 
had improperly excluded evidence and ordered a new trial. See Folkes, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590–91. 
 182. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 399–400 (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the English cases of 
Wright v. Pyndar and Gibson v. Hunter, both of which are analyzed supra. 
 183. See id. at 401–04. 
 184. Id. at 403 (internal quotes in decision without citation).  
 185. Id. at 407. The dissent discussed Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292 (1835), in which the 
Supreme Court stated that while a court can instruct the jury that there is no evidence regarding a 
particular fact, a court cannot give an instruction that takes away the power of the jury to decide the 
facts. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 402. The dissent pointed out that in Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 
362 (1850), the Court departed from Greenleaf and approved the directed verdict for the first time in 
cases in which “there was ‘no evidence whatever’ on the critical issue in the case.” Galloway, 319 U.S. 
at 402. In that case it was argued that the directed verdict accomplished the same goal as the demurrer 
to the evidence. See id. at 401–02.  
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surrounding the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the demurrer to the 
evidence was a specific procedure under which a court could dismiss a 
case if there were no facts to be determined by the jury.186 This occurred 
only infrequently because a case must have involved the legal meaning of 
a writing or a party would be required to admit the conclusions of the 
evidence of the opposing party. A party demurred only to avoid a decision 
by the jury that did not follow the law. 
Earlier, in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,187 the majority of 
the Supreme Court described the demurrer to the evidence more 
completely. In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.188 In its decision that the circuit 
court should not have granted judgment to the defendant, the Supreme 
Court compared the common law procedure of the demurrer to the 
evidence, among other common law procedures, to judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.189 The Court concluded that the demurrer to 
the evidence was unlike judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Under the 
demurrer to the evidence the facts must be admitted in order for the court 
to apply the law.190 The Court decided that, here, under judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, where the verdict of the jury had been set 
aside, there were no such facts on which the court could make a legal 
determination.191 As a result, a new trial was necessary.192 Although the 
Court in Slocum correctly described the demurrer to the evidence, this 
analysis essentially became irrelevant after the decision of the Court in 
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman that constitutionalized 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.193
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 122–27. 
 187. 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
 188. In Slocum, the plaintiff, the wife of the deceased holder of life insurance, brought an action to 
recover under the insurance policy. See id. at 366–68. After the parties presented all of the evidence in 
the case, the defendant requested that the court direct or instruct the jury to find a verdict for the 
defendant and the court did not do so. The jury found that the plaintiff should recover under the life 
insurance plan. Id. at 368. The defendant then unsuccessfully moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Id. at 369. The circuit court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and gave judgment to 
the defendant. Id. There was insufficient evidence of a contract of insurance at the time that the 
plaintiff’s husband died. Id. 
 189. See id. at 388. The discussion of the Supreme Court regarding the other common law 
procedures is found infra. 
 190. See id. at 388–91. The Court cited Fowle v. Alexandria, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 320 (1826), in 
which the Supreme Court compared the demurrer to the evidence to the special verdict stating that the 
demurrer is “in many respects, like a special verdict.” See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 389. 
 191. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 392. 
 192. Id. The Court cited Middleton v. Baker, 78 Eng. Rep. 983 (1600), Wright v. Pyndar, 82 Eng. 
Rep. 499 (1647), and Gibson v. Hunter, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793), which are analyzed supra. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 75–82. 
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More recently, in his dissent in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,194 
Justice Rehnquist attempted to favorably compare the demurrer to the 
evidence to another modern procedure, summary judgment.195 This has 
continued the jurisprudence of the Court by which the English common 
law has not been described completely. Justice Rehnquist stated that “in 
1791 a demurrer to the evidence, a procedural device substantially similar 
to summary judgment, was a common practice.”196 He also asserted that 
“[t]he procedural device[] of summary judgment . . . [was a] direct 
descendant[] of [its] common-law antecedent[]. [It] accomplish[ed] 
nothing more than could have been done at common law, albeit by a more 
cumbersome procedure.”197 Both of these points are subject to significant 
criticism. The demurrer to the evidence is wholly dissimilar to summary 
judgment. Under the demurrer, the demurring party admitted the facts and 
conclusions of the non-demurring party. Additionally, the evidence of the 
demurring party was not considered in the decision as to whether there 
was a claim under the law. In contrast, under summary judgment, the 
question is not whether there is a claim under the alleged facts but whether 
a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party upon the 
consideration of the evidence presented by both parties.198 Moreover, the 
House of Lords clearly expressed the opinion, opposite to that of Justice 
Rehnquist, that the demurrer to the evidence was uncommon.199 A party 
would not agree to the conclusion of the evidence of the opposing party 
unless the law upon these facts indisputably led to judgment for the party. 
Over time, the common law procedure of the demurrer to the evidence 
has been incompletely described by the Court. This description has 
contributed to the lack of rigor in the analysis of the constitutionality of 
 194. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 349. 
 197. Id. at 350. 
 198. Justice Rehnquist incorrectly cited Pawling v. United States, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 219 (1808), 
for the proposition that summary judgment is constitutional. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 349. 
Pawling concerned only an apparent application of the common law procedure of demurrer to the 
evidence. In Pawling, the Court inaccurately described the demurrer to the evidence. The Court stated 
that “[t]he party demurring admits the truth of the testimony to which he demurs, and also those 
conclusions of fact which a jury may fairly draw from that testimony. . . . such conclusions as a jury 
might justifiably draw, the court ought to draw.” Pawling, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 221–22. Professor 
Molot incorrectly discussed the common law device of demurrer in his recent article. Molot, supra 
note 12, at 80. According to Molot, the only difference between the motion for demurrer and the 
modern motion for a directed verdict is that under the motion for a directed verdict the defendant need 
not give up his right to a jury trial as was required under the demurrer. Id. at 80. Professor Sward has 
also discussed the development of the standard of the reasonable jury. See Sward, supra note 168, at 
592–99. 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 128–36. 
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modern procedures such as the directed verdict and summary judgment. 
Although the Court has held that the English common law in 1791 governs 
the constitutionality question, the Court has not recognized principles that 
can be derived from the English common law procedure of demurrer to the 
evidence which are consistent with the principles underlying the common 
law procedure of the demurrer to the pleadings. Such consistent principles 
should govern the constitutionality issue. Under the demurrer to the 
evidence, similar to under the demurrer to the pleadings, the moving party 
admitted the facts and conclusions of the evidence of the non-moving 
party and could not proffer any evidence itself. The determination here 
again was purely a legal question, not a sufficiency of the evidence 
question. The result was the moving party lost if the facts and the 
conclusions admitted presented a legal claim. 
3. Nonsuit 
Another common law procedure which affected whether a jury decided 
a case after a trial began was the nonsuit. A plaintiff could be nonsuited if 
he did not answer after his name was called in court.200 The plaintiff would 
not answer if the plaintiff believed his evidence was insufficient or it 
appeared to him that he had no case under the law.201 The plaintiff could 
then file another writ and try the case again. Blackstone wrote:  
[I]t is usual for a plaintiff, when he or his counsel perceives that he 
has not given evidence sufficient to maintain his issue, to be 
voluntarily nonsuited, or withdraw himself: whereupon the crier is 
ordered to call the plaintiff; and if neither he, nor any body for him, 
appears, he is nonsuited, the jurors are discharged, the action is at an 
end, and the defendant shall recover his costs. The reason of this 
practice is, that a nonsuit is more eligible for the plaintiff, than a 
verdict against him: for after a nonsuit, which is only a default, he 
may commence the same suit again for the same cause of action; 
but after a verdict had, and judgment consequent thereupon, he is 
for ever barred, from attacking the defendant upon the same ground 
of complaint.202
 200. 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 586–87. 
 201. See id. at 586 (legal problem includes the case being tried in the wrong place). 
 202. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 376–77; see also BULLER, supra note 109, at 330–31 
(listing cases involving costs where nonsuits were ordered); 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 587 (stating 
that the plaintiff must pay costs but may bring another case on the same issue). 
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The nonsuit traced back to the time when a plaintiff was required to 
appear in court in order for the jury to render its verdict.203 The plaintiff 
was required to come before the court because if the jury found for the 
defendant, the plaintiff was liable for amercement.204 Amercement was a 
fine imposed by the king for bringing a false claim.205 Although at the time 
that Blackstone wrote courts did not impose amercement, the plaintiff 
continued to be able to withdraw his case through the procedure of 
nonsuit.206
Blackstone had stated that nonsuit was voluntary.207 Tidd also wrote, 
“The plaintiff in no case is compellable to be nonsuited; and therefore, if 
he insist upon the matter being left to the jury, they must give in their 
verdict.”208 In Watkins v. Towers,209 after a verdict for the plaintiff, the 
defendant argued that by bringing the case in the wrong place the plaintiff 
had consented to be nonsuited.210 Although he did not need to address this 
point, Justice Grose stated “we could not order a nonsuit to be entered 
against the consent of the plaintiff but we might have ordered a new trial 
on terms.”211
In certain cases in which nonsuit occurred, however, it is not clear 
whether the plaintiff consented. In what has been referred to as a 
“compulsory nonsuit,” the defendant successfully moved the court en banc 
for a nonsuit after a jury verdict for the plaintiff.212 It appears that the court 
 203. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 376. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. The plaintiff lost the benefit of the writ when he was nonsuited. See 3 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 109, at 316. Nonsuit appears to be of relatively “frequent” occurrence. See Oldham, 
Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 231 (studying notes of Lord Mansfield). 
 207. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 376; see also Henderson, supra note 30, at 300–01; 
Scott, supra note 105, at 687; Macbeath v. Haldimand, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036, 1038 (1786) (“Buller, 
Justice . . . said, that he had been of opinion at the trial, that . . . the plaintiff ought to be nonsuited . . . . 
But the plaintiff’s counsel appearing for their client when he was called, he left the question to the 
jury.”). 
 208. 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 588. Also, according to Tidd, only the defendant could force the 
plaintiff to make the choice. “A nonsuit can only be at the instance of the defendant . . . for nobody has 
a right to demand the plaintiff, but the defendant, and the defendant not demanding him, the judge 
could not order him to be called.” Id. at 587. In 1828, in Doe v. Grymes, the Supreme Court decided 
that a plaintiff could not be nonsuited involuntarily. Grymes, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 469, 471–72 (1828). The 
dissent had argued that although the English rule on nonsuit appeared to require the consent of the 
plaintiff, there was good reason to depart from that rule, particularly given the unavailability of the 
former English practice of amercement—the requirement that the plaintiff pay a fine if he lost. Id. at 
473–75 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 209. 100 Eng. Rep. 150 (1788). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 153. 
 212. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 300–01 (citing, among other cases, Abbot v. Plumbe, 
analyzed infra). Professor Oldham believes that compulsory nonsuits were rare. See Oldham, Seventh 
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would grant such a motion only if the verdict for the plaintiff was 
unsupported as a matter of law.213 Such a matter of law involved, for 
example, the lack of certain specific required evidence. A general assertion 
that the weight of the evidence did not support the claim was not such a 
matter of law. The case of Abbot v. Plumbe214 demonstrates that courts at 
times granted “nonsuits” without the consent of the plaintiff when such a 
legal issue was involved. In an action in trover, associated with a 
bankruptcy, the plaintiff won a verdict against the defendant, the obligor to 
a bond.215 At the trial, the plaintiff had relied on the admission of the 
defendant to authenticate the signature of the witness to the bond who had 
subscribed his signature on the bond.216 The defendant moved for nonsuit 
because the subscribing witness had not testified.217 Lord Mansfield 
opined that, the error, although a mere technicality, was fatal. “To be sure 
this is a captious objection; but it is a technical rule that the subscribing 
witness must be produced, and it cannot be dispensed with.”218 Justices 
Ashhurst and Buller agreed.219 Professor Oldham stated that this case 
essentially involved a case stated such that a question of law—in this case, 
regarding the rule that a particular witness be present—was reserved for 
the court.220 According to Oldham’s study of the notes of Lord Mansfield, 
this use of the nonsuit was unusual.221 Nonsuit generally appears to be a 
procedure used before a verdict, after the plaintiff presented his case and 
with the consent of the plaintiff.222
Where the issue did not involve the law but rather a factual issue, the 
jury decided the issue. For example in Company of Carpenters v. 
Hayward,223 the issue raised by the defendant after a verdict for the 
plaintiff was whether the plaintiff had proved the existence of a particular 
Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 231 n.35. 
 213. See Company of Carpenters v. Hayward, 99 Eng. Rep. 241 (1780); see also Pleasant v. 
Benson, 104 Eng. Rep. 590 (1811). 
 214. 99 Eng. Rep. 141 (1779). 
 215. See id.  
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 141–42. 
 220. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 232–33 (a judge may at times 
nonsuit a plaintiff if “as a matter of law, the plaintiff had no case” but this appears to be with the 
consent of the plaintiff). 
 221. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 232. 
 222. See id. at 232–33. 
 223. 99 Eng. Rep. 241 (1780). 
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company.224 Lord Mansfield denied the motion of the defendant to nonsuit 
the plaintiff: 
It was properly left to the jury to consider, whether the evidence 
produced was sufficient to shew, that there was such a company; for 
that was a mere question of fact; and they were to decide on its 
existence, and whether it was originally created by a charter from 
the Crown, or was only a voluntary society. There was evidence of 
its existence as a corporation.225
Justice Buller agreed: “Whether there be any evidence, is a question for 
the Judge. Whether sufficient evidence, is for the jury.”226
Under the nonsuit, the plaintiff would voluntarily withdraw his case 
when he believed that he had insufficient evidence. The plaintiff could 
bring another action without prejudice.227 A rare species of nonsuit existed 
upon which a court could order a nonsuit after a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff if a particular legal requirement was not met.228 A court could not 
order a nonsuit upon any belief of the court that the plaintiff had not 
presented sufficient evidence.229
4. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of the Nonsuit 
The modern directed verdict, like the common law nonsuit, occurs 
during the trial. The directed verdict is not, however, similar to the 
nonsuit. Unlike the directed verdict, under the nonsuit, the judge or the en 
banc court did not decide whether the case was dismissed; the plaintiff 
would decide whether to withdraw from the case. Also unlike the directed 
verdict, under the nonsuit, the plaintiff could bring the same claim 
again.230 The common law compulsory nonsuit, under which the court 
 224. See id. at 241. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 242; see also Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 233 (describing 
example of order of nonsuit by judge and denial of new trial motion by the court where the case should 
have been given to the jury (the question being “‘of intention arising out of the circumstances’”) but in 
light of the fact that “strong directions to find for the defendant” should have been given the jury and 
“the small amount [demanded] involved,” the court denied the new trial); Scott, supra note 105, at 687 
(in the states, under compulsory nonsuit, a new action could be brought). 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 200–02. 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 212–22. 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 223–26. 
 230. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
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would give judgment to the party who lost the jury verdict, was rare. Also, 
unlike the modern directed verdict, under the compulsory nonsuit, the 
facts were specifically determined by the parties and the court made a 
legal decision, not a sufficiency determination, upon those facts.231
Again, despite these differences between the common law and modern 
procedure, the constitutionalization of the modern directed verdict has 
been justified in part on a comparison of the nonsuit to the modern 
directed verdict.232 In Galloway v. United States, the Supreme Court found 
constitutional the modern directed verdict. The Court stated that because 
the common law constantly changed, the courts were not bound by the 
English common law procedures.233 The Court described the nonsuit as 
changing from a procedure whereby the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his 
case to a procedure whereby the defendant challenged the sufficiency of 
the evidence of the plaintiff.234 Accordingly, the directed verdict differed 
from the nonsuit in this way only as to “form.”235 The Court did recognize 
that the nonsuit, unlike the directed verdict, permitted the plaintiff to try 
the case again.236
The Court had criticized some of the characteristics of the nonsuit and 
the demurrer to the evidence.237 The Court asserted that the Seventh 
Amendment did not guarantee the plaintiff endless opportunities to try his 
case as was possible under the nonsuit.238 Also, the inconsistency between 
the demurrer to the evidence, whereby a party was required to give up his 
case to challenge the other’s case, and the nonsuit, whereby the plaintiff 
had the opportunity to retry his case, demonstrated that the Amendment 
was not intended to preserve particular rules.239 “Alternatives so 
contradictory give room, not for the inference that one or the other is 
required, but rather for the view that neither is essential.”240
The majority had stated that the procedures of the demurrer to the 
evidence and the nonsuit were inconsistent and as a result the 
characteristics of neither procedure were important to the analysis under 
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 212–22. 
 232. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
 233. See id. 
 234. Id. at 390–92. The Court cited only Blackstone and Tidd from the English common law. Id. 
at 391 n.23. As stated supra, neither treatise supports the Court’s interpretation. See supra text 
accompanying notes 200–08. 
 235. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391 n.23. 
 236. See id.  
 237. The demurrer to the evidence is described supra text accompanying notes 122–60. 
 238. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392–94. 
 239. See id. at 393. 
 240. Id. at 394. 
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the Seventh Amendment.241 The procedures do not appear inconsistent. 
Although the demurrer to the evidence required the demurring party to 
give up his claim if he was wrong and the nonsuit permitted the party who 
withdrew his claim to retry his claim, under both procedures, the 
determination of the jury of the facts was most important. Under the 
demurrer, a case was not dismissed unless there were no facts for the jury 
to determine because the facts and conclusions of the nondemurring party 
had been admitted. Under the nonsuit, the case could be retried before a 
jury because there could have been facts for the jury to determine if the 
case had not been withdrawn or in the future there could be facts for the 
jury to determine when another writ was filed. 
The majority also had commented that the nonsuit had changed and as 
a result, the characteristics of the procedure were not important to the 
analysis under the Seventh Amendment. As to any supposed change in the 
nonsuit whereby the defendant could challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the Court admitted that this alleged change was tempered by the 
continued requirement that the plaintiff could retry the case.242 Also, the 
Court’s assertion that a nonsuit could be ordered upon a determination that 
the evidence was insufficient appears to be unsupported. The common law 
rule permitted a court to order a nonsuit only if a specific legal question 
could be determined upon established facts. 
In an earlier case, Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., the Court 
had more completely described the nonsuit.243 In its analysis that the 
modern judgment notwithstanding the verdict was different from the 
nonsuit, the Supreme Court emphasized the common law characteristic of 
the nonsuit by which the plaintiff could opt for a jury verdict and the 
plaintiff could be dismissed without prejudice to the same case brought 
again by the plaintiff.244 In Slocum, the circuit court had failed to direct the 
jury that the plaintiff had not made her case.245 If the circuit court had 
indicated that it would so direct the jury, the plaintiff could have taken a 
nonsuit and tried the case again.246 As a result, judgment could not be 
granted to the defendant and a new trial was required.247 This analysis of 
the nonsuit in Slocum essentially became irrelevant after the decision in 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 391 n.23. 
 243. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1912). 
 244. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 392, 394. The Court cited among other treatises, 2 TIDD, supra note 
109, which is analyzed supra. 
 245. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 398–99. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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Redman in which judgment notwithstanding the verdict was held 
constitutional.248
The cases demonstrate that similar to the Court’s analysis of the 
demurrer to the evidence, in its analysis of the nonsuit, the characteristics 
of the nonsuit have not been adequately taken into account in the Court’s 
evaluation of the constitutionality of modern procedures. Under the 
nonsuit the plaintiff decided whether to withdraw the case and could bring 
the case again.249 Moreover, in the rare circumstance that a court would 
require a nonsuit, it was only with respect to a specific legal issue and not 
a question of the sufficiency of the evidence.  
Although the Court has held that the English common law in 1791 
governs the analysis, the principles that can be derived from the English 
common law procedure of the nonsuit, which are consistent with the 
principles underlying the common law demurrer to the pleadings and the 
demurrer to the evidence, have not been used to assess the 
constitutionality of modern procedures. Under all of the procedures the 
parties agreed upon the facts or the jury determined the facts. The en banc 
court did not engage in a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Rather the court (on the rare occasion it became involved under the 
nonsuit) decided a pure legal question based on the agreed upon or jury 
determined facts. 
C. Procedures Surrounding the Verdict 
1. Direction of a Verdict 
The direction of a verdict was a procedure concerning the verdict under 
the common law. It differed significantly, however, from the modern 
directed verdict. Under the common law, the judge could direct the jury to 
find for the plaintiff or for the defendant.250 The judge had discretion to 
comment, in effect, on the strength of the evidence presented by the 
parties.251 Although Henderson wrote that the direction of the judge was 
binding upon the jury,252 Professor Oldham, in his study of the trial notes 
of Lord Mansfield, concluded to the contrary that the jury was not bound 
by the direction of the judge.253  
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 75–82. 
 249. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
 250. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 233–35. 
 251. See id. 
 252. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 302. 
 253. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 233–34; cf. John H. Langbein, 
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An examination of the cases cited by Henderson demonstrates that 
Oldham is correct that Henderson’s conclusion that juries were required to 
follow the direction of the judge is faulty.254 For example, Henderson cites 
Macbeath v. Haldimand,255 in support of the proposition that juries must 
follow the direction of the judge. While the case states that in the first trial, 
“a verdict was found for the defendant by the direction of the Judge,”256 
the issue at the King’s Bench was not whether the jury was required to 
obey Justice Buller’s direction.257 Rather, the issue was whether, upon a 
motion for a new trial, there was an issue of fact for the jury to 
determine.258 Justices Mansfield and Buller opined that the writings 
admitted into evidence were unambiguous such that there was no need for 
substantive interpretation of the writings by a jury.259 Justice Willes stated 
to the contrary that the jury could have rendered an interpretation of the 
writings in the case which was different from the direction of Buller at the 
trial.260 Henderson weakly argued that because Willes’s opinion was the 
only opinion that she could find that directly stated that the jury could 
disregard a judge’s direction, “the weight of authority apparently was that 
[the jury] was bound to obey [the judge’s directions].”261 In this case 
Justices Buller and Mansfield determined that there was a legal issue that 
the court could decide and as a result no new trial was required.262 Oldham 
concluded that this case did not support the proposition that the jury was 
required to follow the direction of the judge to find for a particular party, 
and that on the contrary the notes of Justice Mansfield demonstrated that 
the jury need not follow the direction of the judge.263
Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
1168, 1190–93 (1996) (discussing the notes of Chief Justice Ryder of the King’s Bench regarding his 
directions to the jury). In an earlier article, Frank Warren Hackett incorrectly concluded that “there 
was no such practice known [under the English common law in the 1790s] as directing a verdict.” 
Frank Warren Hackett, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the Right to Direct a Verdict, 24 
YALE L.J. 127, 136 (1914). “The ‘directed verdict’ of [the 1700] period was instruction on the law, 
advice on the facts, or a mixture of the two.” Blume, supra note 124, at 567. While the traditional 
directed verdict is that as described in the text, Oldham found that a directed verdict could also occur 
when counsel gave up the case and the judge directed a verdict for the other side. See JAMES OLDHAM, 
ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 68 (2004).  
 254. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 302–03. 
 255. 99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1786). 
 256. Id. at 1036. 
 257. See id. at 1040–41. 
 258. See id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 302–03. 
 262. Macbeath, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1040–41. 
 263. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 233–34 & 229; see also OLDHAM, 
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Cases do show that the court might order a new trial if the jury did not 
follow the direction of the judge.264 However, in at least some cases where 
the jury did not follow his direction, Lord Mansfield would not invite or 
entertain a motion for a new trial.265 The fact that under the common law 
the judge requested the jury to find a certain way and did not decide the 
case before the case went to a jury also suggests, as a logical matter, that 
the jury was not required to find what the judge had ordered.266
THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 109, at 150. Henderson also cited the argument of counsel 
in Hankey v. Wilson, 96 Eng. Rep. 860 (1755), to attempt to further support her argument that the 
direction of the judge bound the jury. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 303. This case concerned 
whether the jury should determine whether a party had endorsed a bill. Hankey, 96 Eng. Rep. at 860. 
Contrary to Henderson’s premise, on the motion for a new trial, “[t]he question was, whether upon this 
evidence the matter ought to have been left to the jury? It was holden that it ought.” Id. at 860 
(emphasis added); see also Rex v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 826 (1784) (in a criminal libel case, 
Justice Buller “assured the Court, that he did not tell the jury ‘they had no right to find a verdict of not 
guilty’”). Henderson also wrote without adequate support that judges commonly directed verdicts. See 
Henderson, supra note 30, at 302. For example, in Beauchamp v. Borret, 170 Eng. Rep. 110 (1792), 
the issue was whether the plaintiff should receive back all of the money that he had paid for an annuity 
that had been rescinded. The case stated, “Lord Kenyon was of opinion that both under the agreement 
and according to the justice of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the whole £600 and 
interest, from the time the annuity ceased, and the jury gave damages accordingly.” Id. at 110. As 
stated here, again it appears that the judge may have told the jury his opinion and the jury agreed. This 
does not show the commonality of the procedure nor that the plaintiff was required to follow the 
judge’s opinion. Also, in Coupey v. Henley Whale & Webster, 170 Eng. Rep. 448 (1797), cited by 
Henderson, an action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff sued a constable for taking him into custody 
for an assault alleged against him but not witnessed by the constable. Justice Eyre found that a 
warrantless arrest should not have been made because the constable did not believe that the plaintiff 
would commit a felony and then stated that “[t]he plaintiff must have a verdict.” Coupey, 170 Eng. 
Rep. at 449. Again, these words do not show that the jury was required to find for the plaintiff nor that 
it was a common instruction. Henderson also stated that in most cases where the judge directed the 
verdict, he did so for the plaintiffs. See Henderson supra note 30, at 302. 
 264. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 234; Henderson, supra note 30, at 
302. 
 265. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 234–35. 
 266. Under the common law, judges made evidentiary rulings that included, for example, 
excluding witnesses based on competency and admitting expert testimony. There is some commentary 
that because the modern rules of evidence do not exist in the same state as the rules were in England in 
1791, that this supports other developments in procedural devices that affect jury fact-finding that did 
not exist in England in 1791. Scholars widely agree, however, that modern evidentiary rules are more 
exclusionary than the English rules at common law in 1791. For example, John Langbein studied the 
historical origins of the modern rules of evidence and concluded that the modern rules developed from 
the late eighteenth century into the nineteenth century. See Langbein, supra note 253; see also Stephan 
Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 595 (1990); James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth Century English 
Courtroom, 12 LAW & HIST. REV. 95, 96, 103–04 (1994) (stating evidence system was “incoherent” 
with respect to “truth-telling” and the hearsay rule was not followed closely). Langbein stated that “it 
is hard to believe that the courts of the mid-eighteenth century enforced the hearsay rule or any of the 
other modern exclusionary rules that balance the potential prejudiciality of witness testimony against 
the supposed probative value.” See Langbein, supra note 253, at 1189; cf. Landsman, supra, at 564–72 
(describing the development of hearsay rule in criminal cases in the eighteenth century). Langbein 
found that under the common law, an English judge exercised much power to influence a jury by 
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2. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of the Direction of a Verdict 
The modern directed verdict is very different than the common law 
procedure of the same name. Under the modern procedure, the judge can 
find for one party after deciding that no reasonable jury could find for the 
other party.267 Under the common law, a judge would direct a verdict such 
that he would request the jury to find for one party, but the judge could not 
require the jury to find for that party.268
In examining the common law procedure of the direction of the verdict, 
the Supreme Court has not described the device completely and has 
oversimplified comparisons. In his dissent in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore,269 Justice Rehnquist compared the modern directed verdict to the 
common law direction of a verdict. He stated, “[I]t is clear that a similar 
form of directed verdict existed at common law in 1791.”270 “The 
procedural device[] of . . . directed verdict . . . accomplish[ed] nothing 
more than could have been done at common law, albeit by a more 
cumbersome procedure.”271 Moreover, in Galloway, the Court also 
attempted to compare the modern directed verdict to the common law 
direction of a verdict. In support of its decision that the modern directed 
verdict was constitutional, the Supreme Court cited cases to support the 
proposition that a modern directed verdict-type device existed under the 
common law.272 Those cases, Wilkinson v. Kitchin and Syderbottom v. 
comments regarding the evidence and instructions to the jury. See Langbein, supra note 253, at 1190–
93; Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evaluation 
of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985); Lerner, 
Transformation of Civil Trial, supra note 109, at 204–11. “As a practical matter, it allowed the trial 
judge to dominate civil jury trial virtually as he wished.” See Langbein, supra note 253, at 1195. As 
judges exercised less direct influence over the jury from the mid eighteenth century for the next 
hundred years, judicial controls like evidentiary controls and jury instructions further developed. See 
id. at 1196; see also supra note 109 (describing aspects of the common law and modern procedure). 
Langbein’s conclusion regarding the origin of modern evidence law contrasted with that of Wigmore 
who traced the origin of modern evidence law to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See 
Langbein, supra note 253, at 1170–71. 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 39–41. 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 250–66. 
 269. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 270. Id. at 349 & n.15 (citing Henderson, supra note 30 and Scott, supra note 105). Justice 
Rehnquist cited Beauchamp and Coupey, analyzed supra note 263, for the proposition that a procedure 
similar to the modern directed verdict existed at common law in 1791. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. 
at 349. Justice Rehnquist also cited Henderson, supra note 263, for her argument that to direct a 
verdict was common. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 349 n.15. 
 271. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 350.  
 272. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 391 n.23 (1943). 
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Smith, simply referred to the request of the judge for the jury to find for 
one party.273
Again, in these cases finding modern procedural devices constitutional, 
the English common law, which the Court explicitly has held governs the 
analysis, has not been described completely and comparisons have been 
oversimplified. The modern directed verdict, under which a court can give 
a party judgment, is very different from the procedure under the common 
law whereby the judge could request that the jury find for one party. By 
not distinguishing between the procedures, an important characteristic of 
the common law present in the common law direction of a verdict has not 
been recognized. Consistent with the common law devices of the demurrer 
to the pleadings, the demurrer to the evidence, and the nonsuit, by the 
direction of a verdict a judge could give his opinion of the evidence to the 
jury, but only the jury could find the facts. At most, a new jury trial would 
result if the jury did not follow the direction of the judge.  
3. Special Verdict 
Another procedural device surrounding the verdict under the common 
law was the special verdict. In a special verdict, the jury would set forth 
the facts and a conclusion conditional upon the opinion of the en banc 
court on the law.274 Blackstone wrote:  
Sometimes, if there arises in the case any difficult matter of law, the 
jury for the sake of better information, and to avoid the danger of 
having their verdict attainted, will find a special verdict; which is 
grounded on the statute Westm. 2. 13 Edw. I. c.30. § 2. And herein 
they state the naked facts, as they find them to be proved, and pray 
the advice of the court thereon; concluding conditionally, that if 
upon the whole matter the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff 
had cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff; if otherwise, 
then for the defendant. This is entered at length on the record, and 
afterwards argued and determined in the court at Westminster, from 
whence the issue came to be tried.275
 273. See Syderbottom v. Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 759 (1725); Wilkinson v. Kitchin, 91 Eng. Rep. 956 
(1696). 
 274. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 377–78; see 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 595.  
 275. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 377–78. An attaint “is a process commenced against a 
former jury, for bringing in a false verdict.” Id. at 351; see MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 166 (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1739); 2 TIDD, 
supra note 109, at 595; Scott, supra note 105, at 684. Hale lived from 1609 through 1676 and served 
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A jury could choose, however, to render a general verdict instead of a 
special verdict: 
[T]he jury may, if they think proper, take upon themselves [sic] to 
determine at their own hazard, the complicated question of fact and 
law; and, without either special verdict or special case, may find a 
verdict absolutely either for the plaintiff or defendant.276
In a case decided in 1779, Justice Buller implicitly so stated when he 
declared that the jury “may, if they please, refuse to find a special verdict, 
and then the facts never appear on the record.”277 The special verdict 
would be settled and signed by counsel for the parties, the proceedings 
recorded, and copies of the special verdict sent to the judges for a 
decision.278 However, if the court had insufficient facts on which to base a 
verdict, the court could order a new trial:279
And if in this, or any other particular, the verdict be defective, so 
that the court [sic] are not able to give judgment thereon, they will 
amend it, if possible, by the notes of counsel, or even by an affidavit 
of what was proved upon the trial; or otherwise, they will supply the 
defect, by awarding a venire de novo.280
as a judge for approximately twenty years. See HALE, supra, at xiii. In the eighteenth century, with the 
rise in the use of the motion for a new trial for verdicts contrary to the evidence, attaint was no longer 
in use. Juries continued, however, to render special verdicts if they so chose. See 3 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 109, at 389. 
 276. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; cf. Hogan, supra note 1, at 243 (reprinting Justice 
Story’s article Jury, in which Story described that a jury need not find a special verdict and instead 
may render a general verdict). 
 277. Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, 99 Eng. Rep. 80, 89 (1779); Kinloch v. Craig, 2 Eng. Rep. 32 (1790) 
(requesting jury to find special verdict for plaintiff, jury refusing to find special verdict and finding for 
defendant and then jury finding special verdict for plaintiff with minimal damages after judge 
requested such again); Duke of Pugh v. Leeds, 98 Eng. Rep. 1323, 1326 (1777) (“The Court left it to 
the jury: the jury threw it back upon the Court, and brought in a special verdict stating the lease 
verbatim.”); Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra note 103, at 231 & n.33; Scott, supra note 105, 
at 684; William H. Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 296, 297 
(1925); cf. Pugh v. Goodtitle, 1 Eng. Rep. 1429, 1430 (1787) (setting forth special verdict found by 
jury). 
 278. See 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 596–97. The special verdict was also described as: “dictated 
by the court at the trial, and signed by counsel on both sides before the jury are discharged. If, in 
settling it, any difference of opinion arise about a fact, the opinion of the jury is taken, and the fact is 
stated accordingly.” 1 JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH 
IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 190–91 (1823). 
 279. Id. 
 280. 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 596; Ex Parte Harrison, 28 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1067 (1782) (“the 
special verdict (being insufficient) should be, annulled, and that the court of King’s Bench should 
award a venire facias de novo”). A decision by the court upon a special verdict could be reviewed by a 
higher court upon writ of error. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; HALE, supra note 275, at 
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4. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of the Special Verdict 
While there is some similarity between the modern special verdict and 
the modern general verdict with answers to interrogatories and the 
common law special verdict, there are significant differences. Under both 
modern and common law procedure, the jury finds the facts. However, 
unlike the common law procedure, under the modern procedure a judge 
may order a jury to render a special verdict whereby the jury will answer 
specific questions posed by the judge, or the judge may order a jury to 
render a general verdict based on answers to questions posed by the 
judge.281 These procedures differ from the common law procedure where 
the jury itself would decide whether to render a special verdict. 
In Walker v. New Mexico,282 the Supreme Court compared the modern 
special verdict to the common law procedure. The Court reiterated that the 
Seventh Amendment required that only the substance of the jury trial right 
be preserved.283 The Court acknowledged that it was open to question 
whether under the common law, a jury could be compelled to answer 
questions posed by a court or whether if the jury would not answer such 
questions, its general verdict would still be effective.284 Even so, the Court 
decided that the substance of the common law was not violated by the 
requirement that a jury answer such questions and by the court’s right to 
render judgment contrary to the general verdict if the jury’s answers 
conflicted with the verdict.285 In its determination that the substance of the 
jury trial right was not violated, the Court had stated that “the power of the 
court” should not be limited to the grant of a new trial when the jury’s 
error is clear from the facts and the verdict.286
Because the English common law in 1791 governs the analysis of the 
constitutionality of modern procedures, principles derived from the 
common law procedure of the special verdict, which are consistent with 
those of the other common law procedures, should be applied in the 
constitutionality analysis. These principles include that, under the special 
verdict, the jury decided the facts and the court decided the outcome upon 
those facts. Moreover, while the Supreme Court has downplayed the 
166; Scott, supra note 105, at 685–86.  
 281. See supra text accompanying note 46–48. 
 282. 165 U.S. 593 (1897). 
 283. See id. at 596. 
 284. See id. at 597. 
 285. See id. at 598. 
 286. See id. at 597–98. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
p 687 Thomas book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004]   7TH AMEND., MODERN PROCEDURE & ENGLISH COMMON LAW 735 
 
 
 
 
 
 
difference between the common law and the modern procedure under the 
common law, only when the jury specifically requested guidance from the 
court on the law would the jury’s decision be replaced by the court’s 
decision. 
5. Special Case 
Under the special case, the jury would enter a general verdict for the 
plaintiff, “but subject nevertheless to the opinion of the judge or the court 
above.”287 As under the special verdict, “the facts proved at the trial” 
would be stated “and not merely the evidence of facts . . . and if in settling 
it, any difference arises about a fact, the opinion of the jury [would be] 
taken, and the fact stated accordingly.”288 The special case was a cheaper 
and faster alternative to the special verdict.289 Unlike the special verdict, 
where the full record with the legal issue in need of resolution was sent to 
the court en banc, the record remained in the hands of the officer of the 
nisi prius court while the legal issue was resolved by the judge at nisi prius 
or the court above.290
Both sides would at some point argue the determinative legal issue, but 
in so doing the sides were strictly constrained to the case as made out from 
the factual conclusions.291 If the case was misstated, the parties must 
amend it or if the case was so defective that the judge or court could not 
render judgment on it, the judge or court would order a new trial so that a 
case might be made out from the facts at the new trial.292
 287. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; Allen v. Hearn, 99 Eng. Rep. 969, 969 (1785) (“the 
jury found the following special case:”); Roe v. Hutton, 95 Eng. Rep. 744, 744 (1763) (“verdict for the 
plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court, upon the following case:”); see also Hankey v. Smith, 100 
Eng. Rep. 703 (1789); Hoare v. Parker, 100 Eng. Rep. 202 (1788). The special case was much more 
commonly employed than the special verdict. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 305. 
 288. 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 598 (“It is usually dictated by the court, and signed by the counsel, 
before the jury are discharged.”); see Palmer v. Johnson, 95 Eng. Rep. 744 (1763); 1 ARCHIBOLD, 
supra note 278, at 192; Henderson, supra note 30, at 306; see also James Oldham, Eighteenth Century 
Judges’ Notes: How They Explain, Correct and Enhance the Reports, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 9, 29–30 
(1987) [hereinafter Oldham, Eighteenth Century Judge’s Notes] (describing the special case stating 
that additional information regarding this procedure was found in the notes of judges at the time). 
 289. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 597–98. 
 290. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 597–98; OLDHAM, 
THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 109, at 131; Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, supra 
note 103, at 231, 233–35. 
 291. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 598–99. 
 292. See 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 598–99. Under the special case, because the factual 
conclusions of the jury were not entered on the record, i.e., only a general verdict was entered on the 
record conditioned upon resolution of the law, “the parties [were] precluded . . . from the benefit of a 
writ of error, if dissatisfied with the judgment of the court or judge upon the point of law.” 3 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 378; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 598. If the parties agreed, the court 
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6. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of the Special Case 
Similar to the special verdict, some comparison can be made between 
the common law special case and the modern special verdict. Also some 
comparison can be made between the common law special case and the 
modern general verdict with answers to interrogatories. Like the modern 
procedures, under the special case, the facts are determined by the jury.293
In Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, the Supreme Court 
attempted to compare the procedure of the modern judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict to the common law special case.294 In that 
case, the Court stated that at common law questions of law could be 
reserved for a later ruling by the court and the result could be judgment for 
one party when the jury had found for the other party.295 The Court stated 
that the sufficiency of the evidence was such a question of law.296 As a 
result, where the Court found the evidence was insufficient, judgment for 
the defendant rather than a new trial was appropriate.297
While the Supreme Court attempted to compare the common law 
procedure of the special case (in that case, referred to as reservation of an 
issue of law) to the modern procedure of judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the procedures are very different. Under the common law, the 
could permit a special case to be amended to a special verdict so that a law question would be resolved 
by a higher court on writ of error. See 2 TIDD, supra note 158, at 898. Henderson argued that the jury 
generally had little involvement under the procedures of the special case (also called case reserved or 
case stated) and the special verdict. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 305–07. Professor Oldham 
contested this finding of Henderson as to the special case. See Oldham, Seventh Amendment Right, 
supra note 103, at 235. Under his study of the notes of Lord Mansfield, he found that the jury was as 
much involved in suits that involved the special case as in other suits. Id. 
 293. Under the common law, this determination by the jury seemed to occur only when counsel 
did not agree on the facts. See supra text accompanying note 288. 
 294. Balt. & Carolina, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). In Redman, after both parties 
presented evidence to the jury, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and also for a directed 
verdict on the ground that the evidence did not support a jury finding for the plaintiff. Id. at 656. The 
court gave the jury the case subject to the court’s reservation of its decisions on the motions. Id. Under 
the state law of New York, courts could reserve legal questions. See id. at 661. Because the Supreme 
Court ultimately decided this practice was similar to a practice of the common law, the New York state 
law can be disregarded for purposes of this Article. After the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, 
the court denied the motions. See id. at 656. The court of appeals determined that the evidence did not 
support a verdict for the plaintiff, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered a new trial. Id. 
 295. See id. at 659–60.  
 296. See id. at 659. 
 297. See id. at 661. The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Slocum v. New York Life 
Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913), in which the Court found unconstitutional judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 657–59. The Court stated that unlike in Slocum, 
the lower court had reserved the question of the sufficiency of the evidence posed by the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss and motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 658–59. 
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facts were determined by the jury upon disagreement of the parties of the 
facts and then the judge or the en banc court, using the established facts, 
determined the legal issue.298 In contrast, under the modern procedure of 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a party requests a re-examination of 
the facts and the law, and the judge, independent of the decision of the 
jury, examines the facts presented at trial and the governing law.299 Under 
the common law, the only method by which such a determination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence could be made was by a motion for a new trial, 
described infra.300
The Supreme Court has held that the rules of the English common law 
in 1791 govern the constitutionality analysis under the Seventh 
Amendment. The special case is consistent with the other common law 
procedures described in this Article. Under this procedure, if the parties 
could not agree on the facts, the jury decided the facts, and the judge or the 
en banc court decided only legal questions. 
D. Procedures After the Verdict 
1. Arrest of Judgment 
In addition to the use of procedures that affected the verdict before or 
surrounding the verdict, common law courts could “arrest the judgment” 
after trial.301 According to Blackstone, a motion for arrest of judgment was 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 287–92. 
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 300. Redman cited the pre-Amendment English cases of Carelton v. Griffin, Coppendale v. 
Bridgen, Bird v. Randall, Price v. Neal, Basset v. Thomas, and Timmins v. Rowlinson regarding the 
procedure of case stated. See id. at 659–60 n.5. The cases do not, however, support the 
constitutionality of the modern judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Timmins v. Rowlinson, 97 
Eng. Rep. 1003 (1765) (after a jury verdict for plaintiff, court makes a legal determination interpreting 
statutes upon a case stated and grants judgment to defendant); Basset v. Thomas, 97 Eng. Rep. 916 
(1763) (after a jury verdict for plaintiff, court makes legal determination upon the case stated—here, a 
document—and grants judgment to defendants); Bird v. Randall, 97 Eng. Rep. 866 (1762) (after a jury 
verdict for plaintiff, court makes a legal determination upon the case stated and grants judgment to 
defendant); Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762) (after a jury verdict for plaintiff, court makes a 
legal determination upon a case stated and grants judgment to defendant); Coppendale v. Bridgen, 97 
Eng. Rep. 576 (1759) (after jury verdict for plaintiff, court makes legal determination interpreting 
statute upon the case stated and grants judgment to the defendants); Carleton v. Griffin, 97 Eng. Rep. 
443 (1758) (after jury verdict for plaintiff, court makes a legal determination upon the case stated—
here, the writings in a will—and grants judgment to the other party). The cases simply demonstrate the 
common law principles that the court decided questions of law upon undisputed facts and that courts 
interpreted writings. See Sward, supra note 168, at 616–19 (describing facts in the cases and 
distinguishing the case reserved from judgment notwithstanding the verdict). The facts were on the 
record or agreed to by the parties. See BAKER, supra note 115, at 84. 
 301. The en banc court decided this motion. 
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supported by error “intrinsic” to the record.302 Such error occurred under 
three circumstances. The first circumstance was “where the declaration 
varie[d] totally from the original writ.”303 As an example, this happened 
where the plaintiff obtained a writ in debt or detinue and proceeded upon 
that writ to declare an action in assumpsit.304 If the trial proceeded to 
verdict, the defendant could move for arrest of judgment, because “if the 
declaration does not pursue the nature of the writ, the court’s authority 
totally fails.”305 The court had jurisdiction to hear only causes of action 
provided by writs.306 If a trial proceeded to verdict where the declaration 
was not supported by writ, the verdict could not stand because the court 
did not have authority to hear that action.307
The second circumstance under which a court would grant a motion to 
arrest judgment was “where the verdict materially differ[ed] from the 
pleadings and issue thereon.”308 The verdict differed materially from the 
pleadings where, for example, the jury found something not alleged in the 
declaration.309 Blackstone provided an example of such error where, in an 
action for words, the plaintiff declared “the defendant said that ‘the 
plaintiff is a bankrupt’” and the jury returned a verdict finding that the 
defendant said “‘the plaintiff will be a bankrupt.’”310 The jury rendered a 
verdict of fact that the plaintiff did not declare. As a result, the defendant 
could properly move for an arrest of judgment on that verdict.311
The final circumstance under which a court would grant a motion for 
arrest of judgment was where “the case laid in the declaration [was] not 
sufficient in point of law to found an action upon.”312 The declaration was 
insufficient to found an action as a matter of law where the facts alleged 
could not give rise to the action.313 The “invariable rule” was “‘that 
whatever is alleged in arrest of judgment must be such matter, as would 
upon demurrer have been sufficient to overturn the action or plea.’”314 
 302. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 393; see 2 TIDD, supra note, 109 at 612 (“The only 
ground of arresting the judgment, at this day, is some matter intrinsic, appearing upon the face of the 
record, which would render it erroneous and reversible.”). 
 303. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 393. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See id. at 393–94. 
 312. Id. at 393. 
 313. See id. at 394. 
 314. Id. 
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While an arrest of judgment had at least to allege a matter that could have 
supported a demurrer to the pleadings, every such motion for arrest of 
judgment upon a matter sufficient to support a demurrer was not sufficient 
to support a motion for arrest of judgment.315 The arrest of judgment was 
thus more narrow than the demurrer to the pleadings.316 The reason, 
according to Blackstone, was: 
the verdict ascertains those facts, which before from the inaccuracy 
of the pleadings might be dubious; since the law will not suppose, 
that a jury under the inspection of a judge would find a verdict for 
the plaintiff or defendant, unless he had proved those circumstances, 
without which his general allegation is defective. Exceptions 
therefore, that are moved in arrest of judgment, must be much more 
material and glaring than such as will maintain a demurrer: or, in 
other words, many inaccuracies and omissions, which would be 
fatal, if early observed, are cured by a subsequent verdict; and not 
suffered, in the last stage of a cause, to unravel the whole 
proceedings.317
 315. See id. at 394; cf. Henderson, supra note 30, at 316 (judgment non obstante verdicto or arrest 
of judgment appropriate only when demurrer would have been appropriate). 
 316. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 394. 
 317. Id. Tidd stated: 
At common law, when any thing is omitted in the declaration, though it be matter of 
substance, if it be such as, without proving it at the trial, the plaintiff could not have had a 
verdict, and there be a verdict for the plaintiff, such omission shall not arrest the judgment. 
This rule however is to be understood with some limitation; for on looking into the cases, it 
appears to be, that where the plaintiff has stated his title, or ground of action, defectively or 
inaccurately, (because, to entitle him to recover, all circumstances necessary, in form or 
substance, to compleat [sic] the title so imperfectly stated, must be proved at the trial,) it is a 
fair presumption, after a verdict, that they were proved; but that where the plaintiff totally 
omits to state his title or cause of action, it need not be proved at the trial, and therefore there 
is no room for presumption. 
2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 614. In Avery v. Hoole, 98 Eng. Rep. 1383 (1778), cited by Tidd, in an 
action for “debt on the game laws,” the declaration read, “that the defendant used a gun, being an 
engine to kill and destroy the game.” Id. at 1383. The issue was whether this statement in the 
declaration sufficiently set forth a case for debt on the game laws. See id. After a verdict for the 
plaintiff, the defendant moved for arrest of judgment, arguing that the statement did not sufficiently 
support the action because the statement, literally construed, did not allege that the defendant actually 
destroyed the game. See id. Lord Mansfield noted that the defendant’s original objection at nisi prius 
never contended that the plaintiff’s declaration failed to allege the offense, but that the defendant 
objected only that the declaration was ambiguous, i.e., “that the offence was not charged in the 
declaration with sufficient certainty.” Id. at 1383–84. In denying the motion to arrest judgment, 
Mansfield stated “It has been very truly said, that a verdict will not mend the matter, where the gist of 
the action is not laid in the declaration. But it will cure ambiguity.” Id. at 1384. According to Justice 
Mansfield, Frederick v. Lookup, 98 Eng. Rep. 51 (1767), controlled in Avery v. Hoole. Id. In 
Frederick, which arose in debt on a gaming law, apparently the plaintiff alleged that the defendant lost 
money gambling at the parish of St. Paul’s Covent Garden, but failed to pay. See Frederick, 98 Eng. 
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Blackstone cites as an example an action for slander against the 
defendant for his alleged reference to the plaintiff by an ethnic reference, 
which the defendant had denied that he had made.318 If the jury returned a 
verdict that found that the defendant had indeed made the ethnic reference, 
the defendant could move for an arrest of judgment on the ground that to 
refer to the plaintiff by this ethnic term was not actionable.319 If the court 
decided “to call a man [such an ethnic reference] is not actionable” the 
court would arrest the judgment because it is essential to the cause of 
action of slander that the words be actionable.320 If, on the other hand, the 
date of the slander had not been declared, this would not be sufficient to 
arrest judgment.321
As another example, if a declaration was flawed because the plaintiff 
failed to plead a title, then the verdict would not permit the inference 
necessary for the verdict to cure the flaw—that is, that the jury found on 
evidence the fact of the title in reaching its verdict.322 However, if the 
declaration was flawed because the plaintiff declared a title, but did so 
improperly or badly, then the verdict would permit an inference that the 
jury must have found the fact of the title in rendering a verdict, regardless 
of it having been badly declared.323 “[O]r, in other words, nothing is to be 
presumed after verdict, but what is expressly stated in the declaration, or 
necessarily implied from the facts which are stated.”324
Judgment could be arrested upon three circumstances. The declaration 
varied totally from the original writ. The verdict differed materially from 
the pleadings. Or the case in the declaration was not sufficient in law to 
found an action. 
Rep. at 53. The plaintiff won a verdict in his favor at trial. Id. The defendant motioned for arrest of 
judgment, on the ground that “[i]t is not shewn nor alledged, that the offence was committed in that 
parish: it is laid to be ‘at Westminster aforesaid,’ without specifying any parish at all.” Id. at 53. The 
court found, however: 
This is after verdict. It must have been proved at the trial, “that the offence was committed in 
the parish of St. Paul’s Covent Garden:” for, the jury have found “that Sir Thomas doth owe 
to the poor of that parish.” . . . “that wheresoever it may be presumed that anything must of 
necessity be given in evidence, the want of mentioning it in the record will not vitiate it after 
a verdict.” . . . It is only a title defectively set forth. There is nothing upon the record contrary 
to it. 
Id. 
 318. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 393. 
 319. See id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 394. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See id.; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 614–15. 
 324. 2 TIDD, supra note 158, at 919. 
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2. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of Arrest of Judgment 
While both the modern judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the 
common law arrest of judgment occur after a jury verdict, judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is not similar to the arrest of judgment.325 
Under the modern procedure of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a 
judge may dismiss a case after a jury renders a verdict for the plaintiff.326 
The standard for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same 
standard for dismissal by summary judgment or directed verdict.327 A 
judge determines whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving 
party.328 Under the motion, the sufficiency of the evidence is examined 
unlike under the common law arrest of judgment (and the common law 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict), which examines only the 
sufficiency of the pleadings.  
In the majority opinion in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 
which is not the current law, the Supreme Court distinguished the modern 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict from the arrest of judgment. The 
Court described that under the common law, the only ways to avoid a 
verdict without a new trial was under the motion for judgment non 
obstante verdicto and under the motion to arrest judgment on the 
verdict.329 Both of these motions could be granted after consideration of 
only the pleadings and not the evidence, unlike the action that the 
defendant sought in Slocum.330 In the denial of a new trial to the plaintiff, 
the circuit court of appeals had found facts and usurped the power of the 
jury to decide facts.331 The circuit court should have, however, instructed 
the jury that insufficient evidence had been presented on behalf of the 
plaintiff.332 The Court stated that a court may direct the jury to find a 
certain verdict but may not avoid a jury, disregard a verdict, or decide fact 
issues itself.333 The Court stated that even in a case in which the facts are 
undisputed, the jury must decide the facts unless the parties waive their 
 325. Under the common law, although the equivalent motion to the arrest of judgment for the 
plaintiff was called judgment notwithstanding the verdict, there was no common law procedure similar 
to the modern judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
 326. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 327. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45, 49. 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45, 49. 
 329. See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 381 (1913). 
 330. See id. at 382. 
 331. See id. at 380. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See id. at 387–88. 
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right to a jury trial.334 The Court concluded that “[w]hether in a given case 
there is a right to a trial by jury is to be determined by an inspection of the 
pleadings, and not by an examination of the evidence.”335
The dissent attempted to compare judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
to other practices including the Pennsylvania law and the federal practice 
in Pennsylvania courts of the reservation of a point of law under judgment 
non obstante veredicto.336 The dissent stated that the fact that the judgment 
non obstante verdicto pertained only to a dismissal at the pleadings stage 
and not a dismissal after a jury verdict was a matter of form not 
substance.337
The analysis of the common law procedures by the majority in Slocum 
is sound. It essentially became irrelevant, however, given the subsequent 
decision in Redman that judgment notwithstanding the verdict was 
constitutional. The common law procedures of arrest of judgment and 
judgment non obstante verdicto did not permit the court to grant judgment 
contrary to the verdict of a jury that was found upon insufficient evidence. 
Instead, under the common law, a new trial was required under those 
circumstances. 
Thus, in the discussion of modern procedure, the English common law 
procedure of the arrest of judgment has not been adequately taken into 
account. The common law principles underlying the arrest of judgment 
have not been recognized. Under the common law, if a jury found a 
verdict, it was presumed that it properly did so if the finding was generally 
supported by the pleadings. The finding of the jury was given great weight 
and the court arrested judgment only when there were legal deficiencies 
between the action or verdict and the pleadings. As described more below, 
these principles comport with the principles underlying the other common 
law devices. 
3. New Trial 
Another procedure by which common law courts in England affected 
verdicts after a jury trial was by order of new trials. Under the English 
common law, the power of the court to order a new trial after a jury verdict 
was a valued part of the jury system. Lord Mansfield commented: “if the 
Courts of Common Law had not power to grant new trials, and have the 
 334. See id. at 385. 
 335. Id. at 398. 
 336. See id. at 400–28 (Hughes, J.; Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 337. See id. at 401–02. 
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question again examined into (though a verdict had passed), trials by juries 
would never have subsisted so long as they have done.”338 Lord Mansfield 
also wrote that courts granted new trials with more liberality than in the 
past: 
But, for some centuries past, by increase of commerce, &c. matters 
of the greatest consequence, and containing a variety of intricate 
facts, are become the subjects of this sort of trial [(jury trials)]; and, 
therefore, though they are permitted to stand, from the real, and 
intrinsic, excellence of them, yet, to prevent the inconvenience, in 
modern times, of tying down the party absolutely by the verdict of a 
jury in all cases, Courts have been more liberal in granting new 
trials than formerly.339
A court could grant a new trial for a variety of reasons. Blackstone 
wrote: “a motion for a second trial is the shortest, cheapest, and most 
effectual cure for all imperfections in the verdict; whether they arise from 
the mistakes of the parties themselves, of their counsel or attornies [sic], or 
even of the judge or jury.”340 The grounds for a new trial included: (1) 
“want of notice of trial”;341 (2) “any flagrant misbehavior of the party 
prevailing towards the jury”;342 (3) “any gross misbehavior of the jury 
among themselves”;343 (4) “the jury have brought in a verdict without or 
contrary to evidence”;344 (5) “exorbitant damages”;345 or (6) “if the judge 
 338. Bright v. Eynon, 96 Eng. Rep. 1104, 1105 (1757) (“so necessary is this power to the 
attainment of justice—so beneficial is it to the people”). 
 339. Id. at 1106. Previously, the only alternative to overturning a verdict was by attaint. 
Blackstone wrote, “Formerly the only remedy for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was by writ of 
attaint.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 389. However, the concept of attaint was replaced by a 
new trial and eventually attaint became obsolete in eighteenth century England. See id. 
 340. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 393. 
 341. Id. at 387; see 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 605. 
 342. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 387; see also 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 605. 
 343. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 387; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 605 (noting that the 
misbehavior of the jury can include “casting lots for their verdict”); BULLER, supra note 109, at 320 
(stating, “New trials are often granted for the misbehavior of the jury, as if they cast lots for their 
verdict”). 
 344. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 387; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 606–07; BULLER, 
supra note 109, at 321; Woodgate v. Knatchbull, 100 Eng. Rep. 80, 84 (1787); Hoskins v. Pickersgill, 
99 Eng. Rep. 623, 624 (1783); Bright v. Eynon, 96 Eng. Rep. 1104, 1106 (1757); see also THE 
COMPLETE JURYMAN, supra note 109, at 186 (1752) (A judge may order the jury attainted or a new 
trial when the jury makes a “finding contrary to the evidence” or when the jury “find[s] out of the 
Compass of the issue.”). 
 345. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 387; 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 607–08 (noting that 
“the damages must be such, as appear at first blush to be outrageous, and indicate passion or partiality 
in the jury”). If a jury rendered excessive damages, a court could order a new trial, courts generally did 
not order such new trials in cases which involved uncertain damages. See BULLER, supra note 109, at 
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himself has mis-directed the jury.”346 It was within the “discretion” of the 
court to grant a new trial.347 “[T]he courts [did not] lend too easy an ear to 
every application for a review of the former verdict. They must be 
satisfied, that there [were] strong probable grounds to suppose that the 
merits [had] not been fairly and fully discussed.”348 A court could not 
grant a new trial “where the scales of evidence [hung] nearly equal: that, 
which [leaned] against the former verdict, [was] ought . . . very strongly to 
preponderate.”349
Only the en banc court would decide such motions for new trials.350 
The trial judge would report the evidence to the en banc court,351 and “if 
[the judge] declare himself dissatisfied with the Verdict, it is pretty much 
of Course to grant” the new trial.352 Lord Mansfield emphasized, however, 
the importance of the en banc decision when he stated that a new trial is 
ordered “where the jury have given a verdict against the opinion, not only 
of a single Judge, but of the whole Court.”353
Bright v. Eynon,354 decided in 1757, is an example of a case in which 
the en banc court ordered a new trial where the evidence was insufficient 
to support the verdict.355 The case involved a debt owed by the defendant, 
which was never paid, and the issue in the case was whether the plaintiff, 
the executor of an estate, had proven fraud by the defendant in allegedly 
attempting to avoid the debt.356 The plaintiff offered evidence of a note 
dated September 29, 1753, in which the defendant borrowed sixty pounds 
from a Mrs. H.C.357 Under the terms of the loan, the defendant agreed to 
pay interest at the rate of five percent and to pay the principal upon six 
321; Thomas, supra note 25, at 775–82; cf. Lettow, supra note 109, at 512–13, 547 (distinguishing 
between the greater control of the jury by the King’s Bench than the Common Pleas court). 
 346. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 387; see 2 TIDD, supra note 109, at 606; BULLER, supra 
note 109, at 321; see also THE COMPLETE JURYMAN, supra note 109, at 264 (“General Causes of new 
Trials are want of due Notice, Practice with, or Misdemeanors of the Jury, in either Party or their 
Agents, the Absence of some material Witness, which they could not then have, Verdict against 
Evidence, excessive damages, etc.”); Henderson, supra note 30, at 311–12 (discussing English courts’ 
practice of granting new trials). 
 347. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 392. 
 348. Id. at 391. 
 349. Id. at 392. 
 350. Lettow, New Trial, supra note 109, at 525; Scott, supra note 105, at 682. 
 351. See BULLER, supra note 109, at 321; Lettow, New Trial, supra note 109, at 543. 
 352. BULLER, supra note 109, at 321. 
 353. Bright v. Eynon, 96 Eng. Rep. 1104, 1104 (1757). In at least some cases, a different judge 
would sit for the second trial. See, e.g., Tindal v. Brown, 99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1786). 
 354. Bright, 96 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1757). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
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months notice.358 After the defendant admitted that the note was his and 
that the plaintiff had given him six months notice, the plaintiff rested his 
case.359 Attempting to rebut this evidence, the defendant offered a 
“subsequent defeasance-note” from Mrs. H.C. dated October 10, 1753, all 
in the hand-writing of the defendant but purportedly also signed by Mrs. 
H.C.360 This note stated: 
I do hereby promise to Mr. John Eynon, that, in consideration of his 
paying me interest for the ₤60 he has of mine, after the rate of ₤5 
per cent. [sic] for my life, the money shall be his at my death; and 
the note he has given me for the same shall be null, and void.361
The plaintiff argued that the defendant forged the note.362 The available 
evidence in the case included among other things that Mrs. H.C. had very 
little money, that she had no special relationship with the defendant, and 
that she also made several attempts to recover her money from the 
defendant.363 The jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff moved for 
a new trial.364 In his discussion of whether the motion for a new trial 
should be granted, Lord Mansfield, who had tried the case, stated that: 
[A]ll presumptions, arising either out of the evidence, or from the 
nature of the question, must be construed favourably in support of 
the verdict; therefore, the Judge certifying only, that he thinks the 
weight of evidence was against the verdict, or, that, if he had been 
on the jury, he should have been of a different opinion, this would 
not be a foundation for a new trial . . .; and, therefore, it is proper, 
that a special report should be made, to shew the foundation of the 
Judge’s dissatisfaction, that the whole Court may judge whether it is 
well grounded, or not.365
Lord Mansfield found that this standard was satisfied in that case where 
there was sufficient evidence to infer fraud on the part of the defendant.366 
The rest of the court agreed and a new trial was granted.367
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See id. at 1105. 
 364. See id. 
 365. Id. at 1106. 
 366. See id. at 1107. 
 367. See id.; see also Shirley v. Wilkinson, 99 Eng. Rep. 529 (1781) (new trial ordered upon court 
determining that the jury should have found certain evidence material but they did not); Meres v. 
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Thus, under the common law, in considering a motion for a new trial, 
the en banc court would construe the evidence in favor of the verdict 
winner and would order a new trial only when the verdict weighed 
strongly against the evidence. 
4. A Comparison of Modern Procedures to the Common Law 
Procedure of the New Trial 
The modern procedure compares in some respects to the common law 
procedure of a new trial. Under the modern procedure of the new trial, like 
under the common law, a new trial could be ordered for many different 
reasons, including that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict for 
the plaintiff, or the judge made an error with respect to the admission of 
evidence in the case.368 However, the standard for a new trial under the 
common law was higher than under the present modern procedure. Under 
the common law, the evidence was to be construed in favor of the verdict, 
and in order for the new trial to be granted the evidence must not be nearly 
equal for both parties.369 It was not enough for the trial judge to find the 
verdict against the weight of the evidence.370 On the other hand, under 
modern procedure, a new trial may be granted if the judge finds the verdict 
against the weight of the evidence, and the evidence need not be construed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.371 Even if substantial 
evidence supports the jury verdict, a judge may order a new trial.372
The modern motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict also 
differs from the common law motion for a new trial. While under both 
motions the sufficiency of the evidence is examined, under the common 
law a new trial was granted, while under the modern judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, judgment is granted to the party who lost the 
jury trial.373
Justices of the Supreme Court have described the common law new 
trial in their discussion of the constitutionality of modern procedures. In 
Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., in its consideration of the 
constitutionality of the modern judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the 
Court distinguished it from the common law new trial. The Court decided 
Ansell, 95 Eng. Rep. 1053 (1771) (new trial ordered after erroneous admission of evidence). 
 368. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 369. See Bright, 96 Eng. Rep. at 1106; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 392. 
 370. See supra text accompanying notes 348–49. 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 372. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 373. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45, 49. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/2
p 687 Thomas book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004]   7TH AMEND., MODERN PROCEDURE & ENGLISH COMMON LAW 747 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that although the evidence at the trial did not sustain a verdict for the 
plaintiff under the law, a new trial should have been granted instead of 
judgment for the defendant because the new trial was the only re-
examination of the facts found by a jury permitted under the English 
common law.374 Again, the analysis of common law procedure by the 
Court in this case essentially became irrelevant after the decision in 
Redman that judgment notwithstanding the verdict was constitutional.375
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,376 the majority of the 
Court, in its decision that the appellate review of the denial of a new trial 
motion for excessiveness was constitutional, abandoned any comparison to 
the common law. In his dissent, however, Justice Scalia distinguished the 
modern appellate review of the denial of a new trial motion for 
excessiveness from the practice under the English common law.377 Justice 
Scalia stated that such review did not exist under the English common 
law.378 If the trial judge did not recommend a new trial, the en banc court 
would not grant a new trial.379 In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens 
interpreted the English common law differently than Justice Scalia.380 
Justice Stevens stated that the English common law did not indicate that 
the recommendation of the trial judge was required for the en banc court to 
grant a new trial.381 While Justice Scalia was correct in stating that, at least 
in many circumstances, the en banc court would not grant a new trial 
except upon the recommendation of the trial judge,382 it does appear that 
under certain circumstances a new trial could be granted without the 
permission of the trial judge.383
The common law procedure of the new trial has characteristics similar 
to other common law procedures. Under the common law, the verdict of 
the jury was given significant weight and the evidence was construed in 
favor of the verdict. Also, a case would not be retried unless the result 
clearly favored the party against whom the jury decided. 
 374. See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 369–75, 379, 399–400 (1913). 
 375. See supra text accompanying notes 75–82. 
 376. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 377. Id. at 455–57 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 378. Id. 
 379. See id. 
 380. See id. at 443–46. 
 381. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 382. Justice Scalia cites the following cases which at least in part support the proposition that the 
trial judge must recommend a new trial for the entire court to grant the new trial: Berks v. Mason, 96 
Eng. Rep. 874, 874–75 (1756); Bright v. Eynon, 97 Eng. Rep. 364 (1757); Boulsworth v. Pilkington, 
84 Eng. Rep. 1216 (1682); Redshaw v. Brook, 95 Eng. Rep. 887 (1769); Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 
557 (1774); and Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (1655). See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 457 n.5. 
 383. See Oldham, Eighteenth Century Judges Notes, supra note 288. 
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The above discussion regarding the English common law procedures 
demonstrates that the common law procedures differ substantially from the 
modern procedures. Also, the common law devices could have been 
described more completely and comparisons to modern procedures could 
be said to be oversimplified. This may have contributed to the almost 
invariable constitutional yes associated with modern procedural devices. 
The Supreme Court has not set forth principles derived from the English 
common law apart from an apparent distinction between law and fact 
made by the Court. As seen above, however, consistent principles flow 
from the common law. The next Part explores the principles that the 
English common law expounds and urges the adoption of these principles 
in the assessment of the constitutionality of modern procedural devices. 
III. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES TO ASSESS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
MODERN PROCEDURAL DEVICES THAT AFFECT THE RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL 
In the first section of this Part, the differences between the common 
law procedures and the modern procedures are highlighted. In the section 
that follows, the principles that derive from the English common law are 
set forth to guide the future analysis of the constitutionality of modern 
procedures that affect the jury trial right. 
A. The English Common Law and Modern Procedure 
Early on, the Supreme Court stated that the common law to which the 
Seventh Amendment referred was the English common law in 1791.384 
The Court specifically recognized a role for the English common law in 
the analysis of the constitutionality of modern procedural devices that 
affected the jury trial right.385 The Court examined procedures that 
affected the jury trial under the English common law and compared those 
devices to modern devices.386 In these analyses, the common law 
procedures were described incompletely and stated to be inconsistent, 
although this was not a necessary conclusion. As a result, as set forth 
below, significant differences between the common law and modern 
procedures were characterized as insignificant. 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 59–67. 
 385. See supra text accompanying notes 59–103. 
 386. See supra text accompanying notes 168–99, 232–49, 269–73, 282–86, 294–300, 329–37, 
374–82. 
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First, under none of the common law procedures, except under the 
motion for a new trial, did a court engage in an analysis of whether there 
was sufficient evidence to prove the cases of the respective parties. To the 
contrary, under modern procedures that play a significant role in litigation, 
including summary judgment, the directed verdict, and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the judge engages in an evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to determine if a reasonable jury could find for 
the non-moving party. 
Second, under the common law, except under the motion for a new 
trial, the court considered true all of the conclusions that the evidence of 
the non-moving party was to prove.387 On the other hand, under modern 
procedures—again including summary judgment, the directed verdict, and 
judgment not withstanding the verdict—considering the evidence of both 
parties, the judge engages in a decision as to whether he thinks a 
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff. Under the common law, the 
issue was whether there was any evidence for the case of the plaintiff, not 
how much or how a reasonable jury would view the evidence. Moreover, 
the judge did not decide whether no evidence existed. The parties agreed 
or were required to agree when, for example, only the meaning of a 
writing was at issue. 
Next, under none of the common law procedures, except the motion for 
a new trial, did the court consider any of the evidence of the moving 
party.388 The exclusion of the consideration of the evidence of the moving 
party under all motions, except motions for a new trial, demonstrates the 
characteristic under the common law that the jury decided any issue or 
ambiguity of fact. On the other hand, under modern procedures that play a 
significant role in litigation, including summary judgment, the directed 
verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the judge considers the 
evidence of the moving party in addition to the evidence of the non-
moving party. Thus, the modern procedural system is dissimilar in 
significant ways from the common law rules under which the federal 
system is constrained. 
The constitutionalization of the modern procedures appears to have 
resulted from the formulation by the Court of a constitutionality test 
unconnected to principles of the English common law.389 In the 1930s, in 
its assessment of the constitutionality of a new device that affected the 
jury trial, the Court decided a device that affected the jury trial right was 
 387. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 122–26, 340–49. 
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 122–26, 340–49. 
 389. See supra text accompanying notes 54–108. 
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unconstitutional if it did not exist at English common law in 1791.390 A 
minority of the Court stated that the standard to assess the constitutionality 
of modern procedural devices should be more general, not tied specifically 
to the procedures at common law.391 This standard would preserve the 
substance or essentials of the jury trial in order to safeguard the functions 
of the jury. Later, a majority of the Court shifted from requiring that a 
procedure exist at English common law to this more indefinite standard 
that the jury trial must be preserved in its substance, in only its most 
fundamental elements, and not in the great mass of procedural forms and 
details.392 While this anti-formalistic approach appears reasonable, the 
Court has never set forth the fundamental or essential elements of the 
common law. In this discussion, the Court has referred only to the 
characteristic that facts are decided by the jury and the law by the judge. 
Recently, there has been a sharper turn from the original interpretation 
of the Seventh Amendment. The Court has justified the re-examination of 
facts tried by a jury by stating that facts may become law, at that time 
justifying the intervention of the judge.393 This treatment of facts by the 
courts has been said to be necessary for the fair administration of justice. 
Also, the Court has recently examined whether a judge or a jury could 
better determine the issue at hand.394
Scholars who have examined the English common law procedures to 
attempt to evaluate the requirements of the Seventh Amendment have, like 
the Supreme Court, not described the devices completely and have 
referred to them as inconsistent. Their analyses have resulted in a 
conclusion similar to that of the Supreme Court—the adoption of a 
standard to assess the constitutionality of modern procedural devices that 
does not recognize specific characteristics of the English common law in 
1791.395
The only element of the common law to which the Supreme Court and 
scholars have referred is a distinction between law and fact: law is decided 
by judges and facts are decided by juries. In its decisions, which have 
assessed the constitutionality of modern procedures that affect the jury 
trial right, the Court has not, however, enforced the law/fact distinction. 
Under most of the procedures, including summary judgment, for example, 
 390. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
 391. See supra note 67. 
 392. See supra text accompanying notes 69–103. 
 393. See supra text accompanying notes 89–93. 
 394. See supra text accompanying notes 94–103. 
 395. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
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judges themselves conduct a factual inquiry by an examination of the 
evidence to determine what a reasonable jury could find.396 As described 
here, other than under a motion for a new trial, a factual inquiry by judges 
quite simply was not permitted under the common law. While the law/fact 
distinction may be an appealing characteristic of the common law, the 
common law procedures must inform this distinction, and principles 
developed from the procedures can facilitate this analysis. 
B. Principles to Assess the Constitutionality of Modern Procedures that 
Affect the Jury Trial Right  
The question then becomes by which principles should the 
constitutionality of modern procedures that affect the jury trial right be 
assessed. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial and 
requires that facts tried by a jury may be re-examined only according to 
the “rules of the common law.”397 The long-standing jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court recognizes the English common law in 1791 as those 
“rules of the common law.”398 The Court’s established constitutionality 
test preserves the substance of the jury trial at common law. Consistent 
principles derived from the English common law would give effect to both 
the Amendment and the Court’s test. 
Under the first principle, those procedures permitted explicitly under 
the English common law should be deemed constitutional as used in the 
federal courts. Because only the common law limits the procedures that 
affect the jury trial right, those procedures permitted under the common 
law would be constitutional. Second, a procedure that the English common 
law courts specifically proscribed would be deemed unconstitutional. 
Because the common law limits the procedures that affect the jury trial 
right, procedures proscribed under the common law would be 
unconstitutional. Third, if a procedure was not specifically proscribed 
under the common law, the procedure may be constitutional. The Court 
and scholars have correctly recognized that the English common law need 
not restrict the development of new procedures as long as those procedures 
comport with the common law. Fourth, modern procedures that relate to 
problems with the pleadings may be constitutional. Under the common 
law, those procedures were the demurrer to pleadings and the arrest of 
judgment. Under the demurrer to the pleadings, the defendant, for 
 396. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. 
 397. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 398. See supra text accompanying notes 54–103. 
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example, could demur to the declaration of the plaintiff such that the 
allegations of the plaintiff were taken as true. If there was no cause of 
action pursuant to the law, the defendant won; and if there was a cause of 
action, the defendant lost because he had admitted plaintiff’s allegations. 
A motion for the arrest of judgment similarly involved a problem with the 
pleadings. Upon an error intrinsic to the record or, in other words, that 
arose on the face of the record, the authority of the court could fail. There, 
the court could arrest judgment, ordering judgment for the party against 
whom the jury had ruled. Because the common law permits the evaluation 
of the pleadings, modern procedures which so assess the pleadings should 
be constitutional.  
The next three principles are related. Under the fifth principle, except 
upon a motion for a new trial, a court should not consider the evidence of 
the party that has requested judgment. Sixth, again, except upon a motion 
for a new trial, the moving party should admit the truth and conclusions of 
the evidence of the non-moving party. Seventh, except upon a motion for a 
new trial, a court should not analyze the sufficiency of the evidence of 
what facts the jury should find or should have found. Rather the court 
should decide only pure legal questions upon facts decided by the jury or 
agreed to by the parties. Eighth, the moving party loses if the admitted 
facts presented a legal claim. Under the common law, the admission of the 
facts by the moving party, and the consideration of the court of only this 
evidence, ensured that only the jury determined questions of fact. If the 
facts are not admitted, the court must necessarily engage in an analysis of 
the facts—an analysis confined to the jury under the common law. If 
evidence of the moving party is considered, the court necessarily must 
engage in an analysis of the facts—again an analysis confined to the jury 
under the common law. If the facts are admitted and there is a legal claim, 
there are no facts for the jury to decide and judgment is appropriately 
given to the nonmoving party. 
For example, under the common law, the defendant could demur to the 
evidence of the plaintiff stating that the factual conclusions of the plaintiff 
did not amount to a legal cause of action. The evidence of the plaintiff and 
the resulting possible conclusions were taken as true, and the evidence of 
the defendant was not considered. The facts were specifically set forth by 
the parties for the legal decision of the court. The court would not weigh 
the evidence. Because the defendant admitted the evidence, the plaintiff 
would win and the defendant would lose if the factual conclusions 
represented by the evidence of the plaintiff were possible. The standard 
was not whether the conclusions were probable.  
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Under the ninth principle, the emphasis lies on the right of the parties 
for a jury to hear and decide the case. Under the common law, these 
procedures included the new trial motion, by which an error by the jury or 
judge resulted in a new trial; the nonsuit, by which a plaintiff could 
withdraw his case if he thought it insufficient and could try the case again; 
the direction of the verdict, by which the judge could direct but not require 
a jury to find a certain way; and the special verdict, whereby the jury 
would decide whether the court should decide a legal question upon the 
facts found by the jury. Moreover, other common law procedures, like the 
demurrer to the evidence, highlight this right by the requirement that the 
en banc court could not dismiss the case without a jury determination 
unless the facts and conclusions of the non-demurring party were 
admitted.399  
Because the Supreme Court has stated that the English common law in 
1791 governs the analysis under the Seventh Amendment, principles from 
this common law should guide the constitutionality assessment. The 
principles set forth above appropriately give weight to the common law 
but do not unnecessarily restrict the development of new procedures 
consistent with the principles underlying the common law. The analysis of 
whether modern devices are constitutional is multi-leveled, however. First, 
a court should examine whether the modern procedures comport with the 
common law principles. Whether the devices comport with the common 
law principles should involve an analysis of the apparent standard under 
which the modern devices operate and the actual manner in which courts 
have applied the standards, which may differ from the apparent standard. 
Second, if a modern procedure violates the common law principles, the 
role of the device in the federal litigation system must be examined. Many 
of the modern devices are well established procedures by which federal 
judges manage their crowded dockets. The constitutionality of these 
devices should be reviewed according to principles of stare decisis that 
recognize, among other things, reliance and the rule of the law.400 A 
 399. A final principle that could derive from the common law is that certain issues should be 
determined only by a panel of trial judges. Under the common law, these procedures included the legal 
issues under the demurrer to the pleadings, demurrer to the evidence, special verdict, special case and 
the arrest of judgment. See BAKER, supra note 115, at 79, 83–85, 138–39. Moreover, under the 
common law, the en banc court also decided whether a lack of evidence required a new trial. See id. 
Because the Seventh Amendment provides that no fact should be re-examined by “any Court of the 
United States” except according to the rules of the common law, arguably the specific make-up or 
composition of the courts in England in 1791—in other words, that the court was en banc—is 
irrelevant to the requirements of the Seventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 400. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). How the Seventh 
Amendment itself is affected by stare decisis principles should be examined. In his dissent in Parklane 
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reanalysis of the constitutionality of modern procedural devices may lead 
to the conclusion that certain common law procedures that have in some 
form been adopted by modern courts, such as the special verdict, should 
be used more extensively because the procedures promote the role of the 
jury as the factfinder and permit a court to determine whether the jury 
followed the law. Moreover, such a reanalysis may lead to the conclusion 
that certain devices are unconstitutional. Only a reassessment of the 
modern procedural devices under the common law principles and stare 
decisis will adequately demonstrate the constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality of the procedures and guide the development of new 
procedures that affect the jury trial right. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts continue to remove matters from the consideration of juries and 
to review cases decided by juries. This occurs in the context of a Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence under which the Supreme Court has almost 
invariably decided that new procedures that affect the jury trial right are 
constitutional. A look back at history reveals consistent principles derived 
from the English common law. These principles may begin to guide the 
future analysis of the constitutionality of modern procedures that affect the 
jury trial right. 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), Justice Rehnquist argued: 
[S]ince we deal here not with the common law qua common law but with the Constitution, no 
amount of argument that the device provides for more efficiency or more accuracy or is fairer 
will save it if the degree of invasion of the jury’s province is greater than allowed in 1791. 
Id. at 346 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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